5th Congress Book

06 – Vertical Manoeuvre from a historicalpoint of view

Estimated reading: 24 minutes 102 views

MMag. Stefan Kurz,

AUTResearch Assistant to the DirectorMuseum of Military History 

Military History Institute, ViennaEmail: s.kurz@hgm.at

Stefan Kurz studied history and political science at the University of Vienna. He was a reserve officer (air defence) in the Austrian Armed Forces; since 2015, research assistant at the Museum of Military History – Military History Institute, Vienna; since 2020, provenance researcher of the museum and member of the Austrian Commission of Provenance Research; co-curator of several exhibitions. His research focus is the Austro-Hungarian armed forces up to 1918 and the Austrian Armed Forces of the First Republic (1918-1938), military diplomacy, museum history and provenance research.

Summary

After a brief overview of warfare in the mountains, the author discussed the emergence of specialized mountain troops in the second half of the 19th century, and then gave an insight into the mountain warfare of the First World War on the Italian front. The fighting in the western section of the front in South Tyrol was examined in more detail using several case studies. Based on these combat examples, historical lessons were derived that to a certain degree can still be relevant to military operations in high mountain terrain today.

Historical Evolution of Vertical Manoeuvre Capabilities/Mountain Warfare Mountain Warfare in History

The late director of the Austro-Hungarian War Archives and military writer, Major General Emil Woinovich, stated, in a study guide for the Austro-Hungarian general staff training published in 1901, that “high mountain areas and heavily forested low mountain ranges are not suitable for major warfare“. This viewpoint had a long tradition and was still widespread in military circles up to the First World War. In fact, there were practically no extended military operations in high mountains until the First World War. Where special alpine achievements in the history of warfare were claimed, it was mainly mountain crossings that were meant. This is true for famous military operations in mountainous terrain such as the crossing of the Hindu Kush by Alexander the Great, the crossing of the Alps by Hannibal in 218 BC, the crossing of the Lessinian Alps by the Imperial Commander Prince Eugene in 1701, and the operations in Switzerland under the command of the Russian general Suvorov in 1799 or Napoleon in 1800. The movements were largely confined to existing roads and paths, and fighting took place primarily in the passes and valleys. Extensive fighting in the mountain terrain itself did not occur away from the roads and valleys.

However, the second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of permanent specialized mountain troops. This development originated in Italy. It was here that the Italian government first established mountain troops in 1872 – the famous Alpini. As the formations were recruited territorially in the mountain regions of northern Italy, they were originally supposed to protect the mountain passes. In the following years, however, they were greatly expanded. The number of companies grew to 78 before 1914. After mobilization, in May 1915, there were as many as 179 companies in 52 battalions. From 1874 onwards, this force had its own mountain artillery, and at the end of the 19th century, the first ski training began. The original focus of the Alpini was initially the border with France, and only later the passes to the Habsburg Monarchy. Accordingly, France followed suit with the formation of its own mountain troops, the “Chausseurs Alpins” in 1888, which had reached the size of 20 battalions by 1912. Italy and France thus clearly played a pioneering role in the creation of dedicated mountain troops.

Mountain Troops in the Habsburg Monarchy

In contrast, the development in the Habsburg Monarchy, which had undoubtedly the highest share of mountains of the European great powers, appears surprisingly delayed. There had been formations of the non-standing army recruited from mountain regions since the 16th century, whose members therefore had a familiarity with the mountains. But even the famous Tyrolean Kaiserjäger regiment, which was permanently established in 1813, were no mountain troops and had no in-depth mountain training or mountain equipment.

In 1863, a mountain artillery regiment was formed for the first time. The first steps towards forming infantry troops capable of mountain combat were taken in the 1870s in connection with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian troops were confronted with mountainous and impassable terrain. Based on the experience gained, so-called mountain brigades were created, which had some special features and were supposed to take into account the mountainous terrain in terms of equipment and organization.

The mountain brigades were large units that, similar to modern brigades, were capable of independent combat of combined arms, taking into account that in difficult terrain the connection with the higher command levels and other units could be impaired. Each of these brigades had only five battalions, unlike outside the usual regimental framework of the time. In addition, there were two mountain batteries each, which had special mountain artillery material that could be loaded on pack animals. Liaison elements were also particularly strong, with field telephones, telegraph, and optical signalling equipment available. Mountain radio stations were only being tested on the eve of the First World War. The mountain brigades also had their own engineer companies and more extensive medical equipment than was usual for infantry brigades. The equipment was also better at the supply level. For transport, the mountain brigades relied on pack animals instead of horses and carts.

However, these mountain brigades had no high-altitude training and no winter mountain training or equipment. The soldiers’ personal equipment did not differ from that of other soldiers. They were therefore not mountain combat brigades in the modern sense. Although skiing and winter mountaineering training was introduced informally into the Austro-Hungarian Army at the end of the 19th century, it was not until 1906 that it established real mountain troops, when three mountain regiments were initially formed within the framework of the Imperial-Royal Landwehr.

These were two Tyrolean “Landesschützenregimenter” (“Kaiserschützenregimenter” from 1917 onwards) and the Carinthian Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 4 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 1 from 1917 onwards). In 1909 a third “Landesschützenregiment” was added, and in 1911 in Ljubljana the Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 27 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 2 from 1917 onwards) was established, which was recruited mainly from Slovenes.

In the training of the new mountain troops, great importance was attached to the independence of the companies. In peacetime, the companies were garrisoned in their intended areas of operation and carried out intensive and realistic training. Specialized mountain training included climbing, ice and skiing courses. Civil high alpinists often acted as instructors, and only officers with a private passion for the mountains were assigned. Individual equipment met the most modern standards of the time. As with the mountain brigades, transport and supply were based on pack animals, and while the Landesschützenregimenter had no artillery at regimental level, the individual battalions were equipped with MGs from 1907. They were thus more powerful than entire infantry regiments of the regular troops. The total number of these genuine mountain troops, regardless of their quality, was 16 battalions in 1914, only about a third as large as that of Italy.

Mountain Warfare on the Italian Front in the First World War

The First World War was the first war in world history in which large-scale operations took place in mountain terrain, and in which real front lines in the high mountains were established and maintained permanently. All in all, the mountain warfare fronts reached a total length of 9,700 km; not only on the Italian front in Tyrol, Carinthia and the Karst region, but also in the Carpathians, in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Caucasus, Persia, Asia Minor and the Vosges. For the first time, fighting took place over longer periods of time in snow up to 10 m high, in cold temperatures ranging from -10 to -46 degrees, and at altitudes of up to 4,000 metres. This was most pronounced on the Austro-Hungarian South-Western front – the Italian front.

The Italian Front stretched over approximately 650 km and was characterized by particularly mountainous terrain. This ranged from 3,900 m high positions in the Ortler Group in the west of South Tyrol to the Kolovrat Ridge and Monte Sabotino on the edge of the Gorizia Basin. Although the Italian centre of attack was near Gorizia and in the Karst, the highest and most inhospitable mountain regions also quickly became a combat zone. Mountain warfare was especially extensive on the front in South Tyrol and Trentino. Here the Tyrolean Defence Command had to defend about 350 km of front line.

Only gradually did continuous positions emerge in the high mountains, even if in some places it continued to be the case that only individual peaks and positions were occupied. Often the forces of nature remained the greatest challenge and threat. Two-thirds of all casualties were caused by the environmental conditions. The soldiers not only had to contend with difficult terrain, but also with snow and extreme temperatures from October up to April or May. Sickness, frostbite, malnutrition, dysentery, falling rocks and falls from heights all caused casualties.

During the winter months, more soldiers were killed by avalanches than by enemy action. The number of avalanche deaths on both sides over the course of the war is still contested; the numbers given range from 10,000 to 80,000 killed. However, in the Austro-Hungarian army alone, more than 350 incidents with fatalities were registered, and in the first two of the three wartime winters the Austro-Hungarian army lost 4,529 soldiers due to avalanches on the Italian front. The “catastrophic winter” of 1916/17 was particularly hard. The number of Austro-Hungarian avalanche deaths was almost 3,300. In total 35,000 men are said to have been lost on the Austro-Hungarian side during the winter months due to weather and environmental influences such as avalanches, exhaustion and frostbite.

Caverns and tunnels were an important element of warfare in the high mountains, especially in those areas that were visible to the enemy. Tunnels were dug for different purposes – fighting tunnels, supply tunnels and accommodation tunnels. In the Adamello-Presanella group, for example, 24 km of underground tunnels were dug on the Austro-Hungarian side. On the Marmolata, based on an idea of Ingenieur Leo Heindl, the famous ‘ice city’ was built, a battalion camp of caverns and tunnels completely dug into the glacier with a total length of 10 km. It offered protection from shelling and the weather and ensured constant temperatures.

Despite great alpine achievements and successful attacks in detail, neither side was able to achieve operationally effective breakthroughs, as the terrain and fortifications made it possible to quickly reestablish an effective defence after abandoning a position. Both sides therefore attempted to collapse enemy positions by using mines. Thirty-three such actions are known; sometimes they buried hundreds of soldiers at once.

Because of these arduous conditions and the bitter winter, the time window for military operations of a larger extent was limited to a few months. However, real mass battles were fought in the high mountains as well, for example on Monte Ortigara where 22,000 Italians and 9,000 soldiers from Austria-Hungary were killed or wounded in June 1917. These battles were by no means only fought by proper mountain troops. Soldiers from all regions of the Habsburg Monarchy were deployed in the mountains.

A special challenge was the supply of the troops in the high mountains. This had to be carried out by pack animals and porters. On the Austro-Hungarian side, Russian or Serbian prisoners of war were often used as porters. Because of the lack of pack animals, the Austro-Hungarian forces also intensified the use of cable cars as a means of transport. By autumn 1918, 1,735km of cableways had been built by the Austro-Hungarian army.

For the soldiers, in any case, deployment in the high mountains often meant that they not only had to endure severe cold, but also that rations often failed to arrive or arrived only cold, and that amenities such as newspapers or field post only occasionally made it to the more remote positions. Despite the lower intensity of fighting than on the Isonzo, the battles in the mountains also cost the lives of about 150,000 to 180,000 Italian and Austro-Hungarian soldiers during the course of the war.

In general the theatre of operations of warfare in the high mountains was – according to the famous alpinist Herman Czant – characterized by four features: scarcity of resources, a small number of paths, difficulty of movement, and unexpected occurrence of severe natural events.

Warfare in the high mountains therefore exhibited the following features:

  1. Whoever took a summit position first could rarely be driven away from it.
  2. There was only a small period of time during which weather or snow conditions made it possible to carry out combat activities on a larger scale. From September onwards, the onset of winter was to be expected.
  3. Attacks were more effective in bad weather, so that the opponents could be approached as invisibly as possible.
  4. Attacks were often conducted through rock and ice walls, while enemy crews were held down by supporting fire. This was followed by hand-to-hand combat at close range and by all possible means.
  5. Repairs, and the construction and extension of positions and connections of all kinds – paths, cableways, and telephone lines – were mostly carried out during the summer.
  6. From September to May, the focus was on the struggle for survival, especially against masses of snow. Constant shovelling of the access routes was necessary to avoid burial. When the connection with cable cars and field telephones broke down, supply was particularly demanding.
  7. If a position was abandoned in winter, the enemy could occupy it as soon as the weather improved, because of the proximity of the enemy positions in the mountains.

The Symmetry of Mountain Warfare and the Difficulty of Operational Significance: Examples of Engagements and Combat in the Ortler Region

The western parts of the mountain fronts of Tyrol and Trentino, which were considered to be of secondary importance from a military point of view, were of particular significance from an alpinist perspective. Here were the highest combat fronts of mankind, with mountain ridges of 3,000-4,000 metres above sea level. Here was the longest ropeway of mountain warfare, with 20 kilometres as the crow flies between Carisolo and the Caré alto, and here were the highest altitude battles and the most extensive glacier battles in spatial and temporal terms. Even more than in other regions, a particular challenge was coping with the special environmental conditions. 

The use of troops trained and equipped for high mountain operations on both sides often meant that a tactical advantage gained through a single successful action was quickly offset by an equivalent reaction. The result was a constellation of symmetry which caused the fronts to stabilize and solidify, and which could only be overcome temporarily. This was evident, for example, around the Ortler. Its summit was occupied for the first time by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1916, namely by the High Mountain Company No. 30, which was mainly composed of Kaiserschützen.  From the summer of 1916, a permanent position existed on the summit of the Ortler, which also became the highest position of the World War and was equipped with field telephone lines and a three-week emergency supply. At the same time, the first two guns, two old mountain M.99 guns without recoil buffers, were brought up to an Ortler pre-summit at 3864 m, which thus became the highest artillery position of WWI. The Italians responded by occupying the Trafoier Eiswand (Cima di Trafoi), the Thurwieser and Ortler passes, and by extending the position on the Hochjochgrat. They also brought a machine gun into position on the Thurwieserspitze (Punta Thurwieser), which threatened the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Kleineiskogel (Cima della Vedretta Piccola). The Ortler guns then took up the fight against this MG and successfully knocked it out. The conquest of the Cima di Trafoi by the Italians was thus an outstanding military and alpine achievement, but operationally it could not be exploited to its full extent.

The events around the Königsspitze (Gran Zebru) were similarly dialectical and symmetrical. The Italian army prepared an attack on the 3851 m high peak, as it was in a strategically important position from which the supply routes of the Ortler front could be observed. The Austro-Hungarian troops therefore reinforced the garrison on the Königsspitze and extended the positions on the Königsjoch (Passo della Bottiglia) in front. The Italians worked their way up to these, with the two forces facing each other at 150 m and machine guns from both sides controlling the intermediate terrain between the positions. Despite constant fighting, neither side managed to gain sufficient superiority to turn the situation in its own favour until the end of the war.

Both armies therefore tried to introduce new combat methods to break the symmetry. While on other fronts in Tyrol tunnels were dug under enemy-occupied peaks and summits in order to bring them down with mines, on the Ortler front ‘attack’ tunnels were increasingly built. This was the case for the first time during the attack on the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo). The plan for this came from the creator of the ‘ice city’ under the Marmolata, Leo Handl. Construction began in October 1916. The crews each spent six days digging before they were relieved. They worked in extreme temperatures and poor air conditions and had hardly any natural light during the six-day period. The work continued until March 1917, when the construction of a second tunnel began. Before this was even finished, the Italians had become aware of the work and began to advance into the first tunnel. It was only by chance that this was recognized by the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, who reacted immediately and without hesitation attacked the Italian soldiers. Via a niche in the snow tunnel, the Tyroleans were able to dig a second tunnel exit with their bare hands and take the surprised Alpini in the back, thus capturing the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo).

When the three factors of weather, surprise and coordination of the attacking elements were fulfilled, both sides were repeatedly able to achieve limited success despite the symmetry. A good example of this is the conquest and recapture of Punta San Matteo. With simultaneous attacks in the Adamello group, at the Tonale Pass and in the Southern Ortles group against the Punta San Matteo, the Italian army tried to achieve the conditions for a breakthrough against the Val di Sole and Val di Non, and subsequently the Adige Valley, beginning on 12 August 1918. During the night of 13 August 1918, heavy snowstorms raged, and the Austro-Hungarian mountain troops and mountain guides felt that an enemy attack was impossible in these conditions. Nevertheless, around 100 Alpini, under Captain Aldo Berni, attacked the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Punta San Matteo from the Gaviapass and the Dosegú glacier between 1am and 2am, silently taking the field guards by surprise and holding down the entire garrison of High Mountain Company 21 with hand grenades in their caverns. Subsequently, the daring Alpini advanced along the ridge and also managed to capture Monte Mantello and Villacorno.

An immediate counterattack was not possible for the Austro-Hungarian troops, due to the weather conditions and lack of resources. The positions taken at Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello had an essential function in the Southern Ortles Group. If they were captured by Italian troops, they allowed sight into the Val Monte and thus also the shelling of the supply routes there. In addition, an attack on Monte Giumella, the last support of the Austro-Hungarian position in the Southern Ortles, was imminent. If this peak also fell, the position on the Tonale was under threat from the rear. There was thus an acute need for action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian army. For the recapture, the Imperial and Royal 22nd Rifle Division provided the 3rd Company, and the half MG Company of the Assault Battalion 22 came from the Imperial and Royal 44th Rifle Brigade. It took about 14 days to assemble the necessary forces. The commander of the High Mountain Company No. 30, Captain Luis Molterer, who had already been responsible for the occupation of the Ortler in 1916, was tasked with working out ‘Operation Chamois’.

The goal was the recapture of Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello. Captain Molterer had highly specialized and powerful troops at his disposal. The core was formed by the 3rd Company of Assault Battalion 22, composed of Kaiserschützen. These assault troops (Sturmtruppen) were excellently trained elite troops, specializing in close combat with hand grenades, highly motivated and exceptionally physically capable. Further elements came from the 21st and 30th High Mountain Companies and the Mountain Guide Company 2. A total of 150 men with ten machine guns were planned for the attack itself. In a second wave to secure the captured positions, Mountain Guide Company 11 and the remaining elements of Mountain Guide Company 2, High Mountain Company 21 and High Mountain Company 30, the Mountain Canon Battery on the Giumella and machine guns were provided. Plunging artillery fire was to provide the combat support element. For this purpose, a 30.5 cm M.16 mortar and 28 howitzers with 22,000 rounds were assembled. Communication was to be ensured by carrier pigeons, telephone, radio, light signals, flares and detectors. An ice cavern on the Giumella was set up as the attack start position, and all reinforcement and supply activities for the attack were carried out at night.

The attack formation was divided into two groups under the command of Kaiserjäger First Lieutenant Franz Tabarelli of Assault Battalion 22: one group was deployed under Tabarelli against Punta San Matteo, and the second under First Lieutenant Wilhelm Lička was to recapture Monte Mantello. Each of these groups had an assault platoon, a platoon of a high mountain company, and a heavy MG half platoon. The 1st Group also had a light MG half platoon, while the 2nd Group had a mountain guide patrol. Six heavy machine guns on the Corni Del Morto ridge were to support the attack. Meanwhile, on the Italian side, 57 guns were available in the area, which suggested an Italian intention to attack.

Bad weather and snowfall delayed the start of the attack for several days. After the weather had improved on 3 September 1918, the attack began in such a way that the infantry forces could advance at dusk and the defence in the newly won positions could take place at nightfall. A one-hour artillery preparation was to begin at 6 pm. The 30.5 cm mortar scored a direct hit on the enemy position. The intensity of the artillery fire is said to have lowered the summit of Punta San Matteo by 6 metres. The 1st Group evaded the Italian artillery barrage with shrapnel over the northern slope.  Fog favoured the approach. After about half an hour, Punta San Matteo was captured and 50 prisoners brought in. Only ten minutes later, massive Italian drumfire began on Punta San Matteo, but there was no counterattack.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Group, under First Lieutenant Lička, had to advance against Monte Mantello on the most difficult terrain. According to the order, this had to be done over the summit of Punta San Matteo and past the 1st Group.  Lička, however, when already on the way to the Punta San Matteo, ordered a swing away onto the ice wall of the Matteo south face, since enemy artillery fire was particularly heavy on the west ridge of Punta San Matteo. There it was difficult to find cover or avoid the fire. The ice wall had an inclination of 50 degrees over a width of 500-600 metres. The brigade’s official alpine advisor had stated that it was completely hopeless to proceed via this route; First Lieutenant Lička nonetheless took the decision on his own responsibility. The mountain guides of the group had to beat a total of 600 ice steps for the subsequent troops. This work took about 50 minutes, while forward movement stalled in the middle of the technically difficult ice wall.

In the meantime, the 1st Group had taken Punta San Matteo and counterfire began. The resulting rockfalls hit the 2nd Group, killing numerous soldiers, including the MG half platoon and the medical squad, and thus critical assets. The time schedule could no longer be kept, and the supporting artillery fire had to be extended by 30 minutes. The mountain guide squad penetrated the enemy position first and took an unoccupied MG. The support of two MGs from Punta San Matteo and the well-placed artillery fire finally enabled the assault soldiers and high-altitude soldiers to take the summit of Monte Mantello in close combat. By 20:30, Monte Mantello was taken.

Essential to the success of the attack was the obstruction of the Italian artillery observers’ vision by fog, and the surprise caused by the approach over the Matteo south face, which was considered impassable. The decisive factor was the coincidence that the Italian crew of the MG on the south slope had not manned their gun and did not recognize the approach. Otherwise, the entire 2nd Group could have been wiped out in the middle of the ice wall during their difficult advance. Another important factor was the support provided by the well-placed plunging fire. Advantageous weather conditions and the associated surprise effect, as well as good coordination with the artillery and between the attacking units, and great speed were thus decisive for the success of this and many other high-alpine attack actions.

The implication of this tactical success at the operational level lay in the prevention of far-reaching operational possibilities in the event of an Italian success. This again showed how difficult it was to exploit individual tactical successes at the operational level, and how much the defensive was favoured in the high mountains.

Conclusion Lessons from Mountain Warfare in the First World War

The necessarily sketchy discussion of mountain warfare in the First World War in general and on the Western Front of South-Tyrol and Trentino in particular in this article suggest some observations that could be considered as historical lessons that still hold some value for contemporary operations and manoeuvre in the mountains:

  • Implications of terrain and weather for the supply of troops: Harsh weather and adverse environmental conditions in the high mountains, difficult movement, and the early onset of winter made it necessary to exploit the short season of milder weather for the resupply of troops and the establishment of depots. Precautionary measures were necessary to enable the permanent occupation of positions even when supply lines were interrupted, which could not be avoided. All technical means available (such as special equipment for individual soldiers, cable cars, drilling machines etc.) had to be utilized and employed.
  • Effects of terrain on C3I: Difficult movement, the regular breakdown of communication, and impeded lines of sight due to the terrain meant that every dimension of C3I was more difficult to implement than in lower lying areas.
  • Increased responsibilities and capacities at lower levels of the hierarchy: The implications of terrain on C3I meant that lower levels of the military hierarchy – especially lieutenants and captains – had to assume more responsibility and self-reliance. It also meant that battalions, companies and improvised battle groups needed more means in terms of communication, fire support and supply than was otherwise customary at the time.
  • Significance of peaks in positional warfare: Once a peak was taken it was hard to drive the defenders from it. Peaks also often meant the control of valleys, since they allowed for sight and therefore the direction of artillery fire.
  • Advantages for the defenders (especially at the operational level): The difficulty of movement and C3I in mountainous terrain supported defence, and therefore it was easier to re-establish effective defensive positions once driven from another line of defence.
  • Prospects for the success of offensive action depended on surprise, speed and fire support: The strength of the defence in mountainous terrain and the advantages of positions on peaks made the skilful combinations of all three factors mandatory if an attack was to be successful.
  • Need for widespread dissemination of mountain warfare skills beyond specialized troops: Even in the high mountains, warfighting could not rely solely on specialized alpine troops. In order to achieve success not only at a narrow tactical level but at an operationally significant scale, forces had also to be involved which were not specialized mountain troops (such as in the Austro-Hungarian offensive ‘Avalanche’ in June 1918). Basic mountaineering skills had therefore to be disseminated beyond specialized troops.