5th Congress Book

12 – Introduction to CSS in mountain units

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LTC Adden

2005-2006 Conscript armoured artillery 215 bn, Augustdorf                                           2006-2012 Officer training, Master’s degree educational science, MW training             2012-2016 Platoon leader, executive officer (XO) 4th Mountain Infantry Coy 231th Mountain Infantry Btn.,                                                                                                                                           2016 CIMIC Officer 23rd Mountain Infantry Brig., Bad Reichenhall                                    2017-2018 Logistics officer training | Staff officer training, Garlstedt | Hamburg          2018-2019 Joint Logistic support group officer 472th CSS Btn, Kümmersbruck               2019-2022 Company commander 3rd Mountain CSS Coy 8th mountain CSS Bn, Füssen    Deployments: 2020-2021 MINUSMA, MALI Commander CSS Coy

Email: BernhardAdden@bundeswehr.org

 

LTC Rosenkranz10/1996 Military Service

1997-2001 Military Academy

Duties 2001-2002 ENGR PLT CDR, 2002-2003 Deputy Company CDR, 2003-2010 Company CDR, 2010-2013 S2 &DepS3 & CBRN, 2013-2017 S3, 2017-2018 Deputy Battalion CDR, 07/2018-10/2023 Battalion CDR

LTC Adden: CSS in mountain units in the German Army

Mountain warfare always entails the battle of the high ground – the decisive terrain. Consequently, the logistical support of combat forces must also occur there.

Combat operations in mountainous terrain can only yield success when the deployed forces are adequately supplied with essential ammunition, fuel, water and combat rations. Damaged equipment, vehicles and weapons should be removed, and repairs should be carried out.

In the absence of resupply, combat units deployed in the mountains have an estimated operational endurance of approximately five days, during which they must rely on the supplies carried in their backpacks (self-sustainment). Within this five-day window, it is imperative to establish a resilient supply chain which delivers the critical supplies required by the engaged forces.

In mountain warfare, the primary supplies are ammunition, water (especially during the summer), combat rations, and fuel for stoves, heaters, and generators. Secondary priorities include materials and tools for entrenching and building field fortifications, as well as replacement clothing and equipment. The evacuation and exchange of damaged equipment are of tertiary importance. The supplies must reach the positions of the engaged troops; it is crucial that the supply chain does not stop at the base of the mountain.

This supply chain in mountainous terrain is primarily contingent on three principal factors:

  • Topography
  • The prevailing meteorological conditions
  • The volume and weight of the supplies

Factor I: Topography

Topography stands out as the paramount factor. Beyond the incline that must be conquered, the condition of roads and pathways serves as the chief limiting factor, impacting the extent of logistical routes and the duration of logistical operations.

In mountainous regions, often only a limited number of ‘main’ supply routes and lines of communication are serviceable. In the valleys, asphalted, ‘high-capacity’ roads are available. As altitude increases, gravel roads, paths, and trails become the norm. The combat actions of mountain troops are likely to take place in areas with no established paths.

In the event that one of these routes becomes obstructed due to environmental factors (such as avalanches, etc.) or enemy activities, extensive detours must be undertaken to reach the engaged units. Where supply routes are rare and/or bypass options are limited, it is advisable to maintain transportation capabilities on both sides of the primary supply route. In the event of an obstacle/barrier, this approach mitigates the necessity of carrying supplies beyond the obstacle/barrier. Consequently, only the obstruction needs to be surmounted, and supplies must be transhipped.

The battle for control of the high ground/decisive terrain also implies the imperative to maintain thorough surveillance of supply routes, typically from these high grounds. However, the high ground also provides the adversary with favourable positions for utilizing artillery fire, close air support (CAS), and drones against logistical convoys. Given the challenging terrain, all convoys must hold 360° self-security on the move.

As the altitude rises, the availability of infrastructure diminishes. Wherever possible, existing huts, cowsheds, and bivouac accommodation should be employed for the establishment of depots or concealed supply caches. These depots and caches serve to shorten the supply chain and enhance the sustainability of the deployed forces. Frequently, makeshift infrastructure may need to be constructed.

Altitude not only affects the physical capabilities of the troops but also those of helicopters. These aerial assets can only be effectively employed up to a specific altitude.

The maintenance and repair of vehicles, weapons, communication equipment, generators, and other essential gear usually necessitates the utilization of heavy tools and machinery. Mobile workshop facilities integrated into vehicles can only be deployed in areas accessible by these vehicles. Maintenance and repair of vehicles ceases when the paved roads end.

In mountainous terrain and remote areas, repairs are typically limited to small arms, communication equipment, and generators. For optimal operational efficiency, it is recommended to establish appropriate facilities within the limited available infrastructure. In general, it is more prudent to maintain an ample supply of replacement weapons, equipment, and materials to transport  damaged equipment to the repair facilities located in the valley.

Factor II: Prevailing meteorological conditions

The second factor to consider is the climatic conditions in mountainous terrain. In exposed areas, soldiers’ fluid requirements significantly increase, especially during the heat of summer. This increased demand is further exacerbated by the heightened physical exertion required when ascending. It is to be expected that the estimated minimum requirement of 10 litres per soldier will be significantly exceeded. Complicating matters, there is progressively less water available at higher altitudes during the summer. Consequently, an elevated supply of water is necessary.

Heavy rainfall is not uncommon, especially in mountainous regions. This not only hinders movements in the mountains but can also damage or destroy improperly stored supplies. The only solution in such cases is once again the utilization of the limited available infrastructure.

The use of helicopters is, in addition to the altitude, also subject to weather conditions. In unfavourable weather, alternative methods of transport must be planned and prepared.

In high-altitude and winter conditions, temperatures can drop significantly. Snow and avalanches can render areas inaccessible, cutting off the fighting force from resupply. Under these conditions, it is essential to store temperature-sensitive supplies in a warm environment to prevent freezing. Repair work, especially delicate tasks with insulated gloves outside heated facilities, becomes challenging. In general, personnel must wear tough gloves at a minimum to prevent freezing of the skin to metal surfaces.

In remote areas, a minimum of 7 days of supplies (DoS) in summer and 14 DoS in winter should be stockpiled. This is necessary to ensure that the mountain fighting force is not cut off by adverse weather conditions.

Factor III: The volume and weight of the supplies

Figure 1: Methods of Transportation

The third factor is the dimensions and weight of the supplies. On an average day of combat, a mountain infantry company alone requires 1.5 tons of ammunition for their small arms, anti-tank weapons, and hand grenades

The diagram illustrates the number and types of transport needed to transport this quantity alone. The 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade has a total average daily requirement of 1344 tons of various types of supplies, and in addition, 180 cubic metres of water and 54 cubic metres of diesel (F-54). Loaded onto the German Army’s palletized load systems, capable of carrying 14 tons each, the daily requirements of
the entire 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade would necessitate the space of a football field.

Where only paths and trails are available, or in trackless terrain, transport goods must inevitably be flown in by helicopter. The use of helicopters is to be preferred wherever possible. To facilitate this, appropriate landing zones need to be scouted and set up. Simultaneously, supplies must be prepared for aerial transport. Wherever possible, efforts should be made to reduce weight. Unnecessary packaging and transport containers should be left behind. This is especially true for air transport or when employing pack animals and porter teams.

Given the examples of the quantities and weights of supply items mentioned, it quickly becomes apparent that for three combat units, regardless of their size, at least one unit must be designated to carry the supplies. If the terrain is challenging and no paths exist, or if they are snow-covered, this ratio is reversed; for one combat unit, three units are required to carry the supplies.

In the light of these considerations, it is evident why every march and flight must simultaneously be utilized for the transportation of supplies. In general, there should always be an alternative to the use of helicopters.

The Mountain Supply Chain

From these three factors, it becomes clear that robust planning of the supply chain, and especially the transport chain, is crucial in order to sustainably support the fighting mountain troops. The illustration shows an example of what this supply chain could look like in a fictional mountainous region.

Various means of transport are used, according to the terrain and the available roads and paths. In the German Army, this is only possible through the collaboration of the specialized capabilities of different branches and units. Alongside the trucks, snow vehicles from the 8th Mountain Supply Battalion, Army Aviation helicopters, Combat mountain engineers’ makeshift cable cars, pack animals, and, not least, the soldiers of the Mountain Infantry Battalions as carriers are utilized.

Normally, in the valleys, the 8th Mountain CSS Battalion establishes a supply point for each Mountain Infantry Battalion within three hours, designed to support them for a minimum of 48 hours, depending on operational requirements. Here, supplies are kept mobile, prepared for air transport, and placed on the palletized load systems for several days. At this supply point, the vehicles, weapons, equipment, and materials of the Mountain Infantry Battalions can be fully repaired.

Starting from the supply point, supplies are primarily transported into the mountains by air. At least one alternative transport route is planned and established. Along this route, supplies are transported from transfer point to transfer point. Efforts are made to use the most powerful means of transport to move supplies as far ‘up the mountain’ as possible. German logistics doctrine dictates that supplies should be delivered to the Headquarters and Support Companies (push supply). The fighting units and sub-units retrieve supplies from the supply points set up by the Headquarters and Support Companies (pull supply).

As mentioned earlier, it is recommended that, along mountain roads, capable transport means are available at every transfer point. In the event of roads being blocked by weather conditions or enemy activity, this helps to prevent supplies from being carried by carriers for the entire remaining distance beyond the roadblock. The same applies to the use of recovery vehicles. They should also be on standby at each transfer point for rapid deployment.

From the point where the paved roads and pathways end, or when thick snow cover blankets the area in winter, alternative means of transportation must be employed. These alternatives can include snowmobiles, skidoos, all-terrain vehicles, pack animals, or soldiers as carriers. The choice of transportation depends on the terrain. Transfers between different means of transportation occur at transfer points. At these points, handling equipment (such as forklifts, etc.) or soldiers should be available to facilitate efficient transfers. Effort should always be made to minimize the number of transfers, as each transfer consumes time.

On steep, narrow paths where vehicles or pack animals cannot be used, transportation must ultimately be carried out by soldiers serving as carriers. Depending on an individual soldier’s fitness, they cannot carry more than 20-30 kg of supplies in addition to their personal gear and weapons. Their range is also limited, and they will require recovery time. It should be noted that in planning, both the outbound route with the supplies and the return to the transfer points must be considered. This is referred to as a circuit. For this reason it is also practical to create weather-protected rest areas for the carriers at the transfer points. Additionally, in trackless terrain, measures must be taken to prevent the carriers from falling. In the 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade, the installation of ‘rope rails’ is the responsibility of the High Mountain Infantry Platoons.

In trackless terrain, an improvised cable car, similar to those used by German Mountain Engineers, can be deployed. It allows the rapid transportation of large quantities of supplies. However, several days to weeks are required for its preparation, setup, and dismantling. Therefore, this method can only be used in defence or delay operations. If civilian ski lift facilities are available in the operational area, they should be integrated into the supply chain. Following the model of ski lift stations, advanced depots and supply caches, as mentioned earlier, should be established. Generally, this process is time-consuming and should be carried out before the commencement of the operation. However, during the operation it saves a significant amount of time, as the supplies are already in the vicinity.

Conclusions

It can be observed that a sustainable supply in mountainous terrain consistently demands an above-average deployment of personnel and material. When a sufficient number of helicopters are available and enemy and weather conditions permit, this is the preferred method for rapidly delivering supplies to the end-users and collecting small equipment and weapons that have been damaged.

In general, mountain logistics require specialized equipment and vehicles in order to be executed successfully. The industry offers various solutions, which are often not yet adopted by mountain troops. The use of drones, which are not fielded in the Mountain Combat Service Support, will also significantly reshape the field of mountain logistics in the near future. Despite all the innovations and developments, mountain logistics will ultimately hinge on the fact that heavy loads must be manually transported uphill.

In summary, the following eight principles can be derived to ensure successful Mountain Combat Service Support:

LTC Rosenkranz: The Ropeway Platoon of the Salzburg Engineers

General

Military operations in middle and high mountain ranges are affected by special environmental conditions. The 2 Engineer Battalion provides engineer support up to high mountain ranges, so the Battalion can rely on specially trained personnel and ‘mountain shaped’ equipment and machinery. Its Ropeway Platoon is unique in the Austrian Armed Forces, disposing two rope crane systems, which are presented below.

The Austrian Armed Forces’ military ropeways are generally used for material transport including supplies, equipment and construction materials. They are used in situations where significant terrain obstacles and narrow passages inhibit or completely prevent the construction of other transportation routes.

The military ropeway (cable crane system) serves the supply of troops, as well as assistance during natural disasters and support for military and civilian parties.

The ropeway is not used for the transport of personnel. The only exception is in the emergency rescue of individuals (rescue operation in emergency situations), where an injured person must be rapidly and safely transported to prevent a threat to life and limb.

Technical data of the ropeway:

  • Maximum length of complete system up to 1000 m
  • Ropeway up to 2000 m
    • 24 mm hauling rope, breaking load 60 t -> max. operating stress 20 t
  • Ropeway up to 1200 m
    • 22 mm hauling rope, breaking load 45 t -> max. operating stress 15 t
    • Hauling rope 11 mm, breaking load 7t

The Ropeway Platoon, as per the Table of Organization and Equipment, consists of 8 NCOs and 28 corporals/recruits (in total: 36 personnel).          

Special training courses are required for the professional soldiers of the Ropeway Platoon, in addition to their basic engineer training. These are both civil training courses at the Forest Training Centre OSSIACH, a department of the Austrian Research Centre for Forests, and military courses.

The Engineer Company has its own ropeway training area at its disposal for basic construction and operation training with the ropeway equipment, built by the Company itself with regard to all training needs. It has been proven that constructing ropeways for basic training in mountain terrain is not expedient due to the enormous logistic effort, the environmental conditions and the physical exposure.

Theoretical principles of ropeway construction

Military material cableways are classified as cable crane systems, cableways with self-propelled carriers or continuously running ropeways. Their usage depends on the specific purpose. Cable crane systems can lower and pick up at any obstacle-free point below the hauling rope. This requires a trained operating team.

Ropeways offer the following advantages:

  • Faster construction compared to roads, permanent bridges, and railways;
  • High mobility, allowing disassembly after task accomplishment and reassembly elsewhere;
  • Lower construction effort compared to road and path construction;
  • Insensitivity to weather conditions, making them operational regardless of the season (except for high wind speeds and lightning hazards);
  • Low susceptibility to damage from weapons;
  • Constant readiness for transportation;
  • High transportation capacity;
  • Low maintenance requirements;
  • Few personnel required for operation;
  • Unrestricted nighttime operation during missions.

Military ropeways consist of the following components:

  • Uphill and downhill anchors for the hauling rope (natural or artificial);
  • Intermediate supports (natural or artificial);
  • A hauling rope with tensioner;
  • A Crab (self-propelled or towed);
  • In the case of cable crane systems, a winch with a pull rope and a cable crane.

Times and transport capacities

Construction times under winter conditions depend on snow depth, visibility, temperature, and the prevailing wind conditions, so it is not possible to determine an exact additional time requirement. In general, the transport weight of a light transport helicopter (AB 212) can be transported in one round. The speed of the ropeway uphill and downhill is between 3 to 4 m/s. This means that for a ropeway with a length of 1,000 metres, a round trip, excluding loading and unloading, takes about 10 minutes. With experienced crews, you can expect to transport approximately 1.5 tons of goods per hour.

Construction Process

The construction process follows seven phases of construction.

The phases of construction are:

  • Phase 1: Initial reconnaissance
  • Phase 2: Detailed reconnaissance
  • Phase 3: Survey
  • Phase 4: Calculation
  • Phase 5: Construction
  • Phase 6: Operation
  • Phase 7: Dismantling and post-processing

The main goal of Phases 1, 2 and 3 is to determine all the aspects of the terrain the ropeway should be built in. A further goal is the arrangements with the troop to be supplied. In Phase 4, all the technical issues of the ropeway are calculated. After a thorough inspection and survey of the route, the Ropeway Platoon commander creates his plan for Phase 5, the construction. In Phase 6, the operation of the ropeway, a major task is not only transport, but also a daily technical inspection. Phase 7 is dismantling and post-processing.

The minimum staff of the operating team are:

  • 1 winch operator
  • 2 loading crew
  • 2 unloading crew
  • 1 per each intermediate support
  • 1 only in areas with poor visibility

Equipment

The main parts of the equipment are:

  • Artificial Ropeway supports
  • Cable reel winder (HAWA-S)
  • Cable reel winder (HSW50)
  • Cable reel winder (HSW80)
  • Cable crane machine (SKA1.5)
  • Cable crane machine (SKA2.5)
  • Means of transport, for example a work basket, wood-transport with choker, transport bucket, big bag, transport net
  • Drill Station Lumesa UBH90
  • Injection Station IS400

References

  • Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Dienstvorschrift für das Bundesheer (zur Erprobung); Pionierunterstützung im Gebirge. Wien, Oktober 2017.
  • Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Merkblatt für das Bundesheer; Seilbahnbau; Grundlagen, Leistungsparameter und Gerätekunde. Wien, 2018.

Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (hg): Merkblatt für das Bundesheer; Seilbahnbau; Bauausführung, Betrieb und Sicherheitsbestimmungen. Wien, 2016.