1. 01 - Unveiling the Dynamics of Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare

COL Leon Holc, SVN (A); NATO MW COE Director

The recently concluded 5th NATO Mountain Warfare Congress touched on the critical aspects of mountain warfare, with a particular emphasis on the pivotal concept of vertical manoeuvre. The event brought together experienced lecturers and participants from various countries to delve deep into the dynamic field of mountain warfare, emphasizing the strategic importance of vertical manoeuvre in such challenging terrain.

Mountains have always posed unique challenges to military operations. The Congress aimed to shed light on the complexities and strategic significance of operating in rugged landscapes, highlighting the decisive role played by vertical manoeuvre. Lessons learned from mountain warfare underscore the need for specialized skills, adaptive strategies, and a profound understanding of the obstacles inherent in such environments.

At its core, the event aimed to underscore the complexity of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare, recognizing the advantages that high ground offers while acknowledging the formidable challenges it presents to military operations. Vertical manoeuvre embodies adaptability, resilience, and agility – attributes which are indispensable for success in such demanding landscapes.

Throughout the Congress, discussions revolved around the critical elements and integrated strategies required to effectively conduct vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare. The comprehensive dialogue covered the physical, logistical, strategic, and leadership dimensions, recognizing the dynamic nature of operations in mountainous terrain and the impact of vertical manoeuvre on mission success.

We delved into the principles of parachuting and paragliding in mountain environments, examined the force structures of mountain units, explored the significance of close air support based on experiences in Afghanistan, and analysed the strategic use of drones, especially in conflict scenarios such as the Russo‐Ukrainian war.

The scope of our discourse extended beyond tactical considerations to encompass critical aspects such as Combat Service Support (CSS) and Engineer (ENG) support, medical assistance, and the crucial roles played by helicopters and drones in supporting mountain warfare operations. The lessons learned provided us with invaluable insights, enhancing our collective understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented in mountain warfare.

The event provided a platform for diverse perspectives, expert insights, and collaborative discussions, fostering a deeper understanding of the complexities of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare. The participants engaged in robust dialogues, exchanged experiences, and shared expertise, collectively aiming to enhance their understanding of manoeuvring in challenging landscapes.

The four‐day Congress marked a significant milestone in the collective exploration of
mountain warfare and vertical manoeuvre. Lecturers from many different nations and organizations contributed their insights, expertise, and dedication to enriching the collective understanding of this specific land domain. The vibrant exchanges, diverse perspectives, and invaluable collaborations between mountain warfare experts, troop commanders, school leaders, academia and industry highlighted the depth of the discussions and the wealth of knowledge shared during the event.

The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

See the Power point Presentation of titled “support and cooperation with other COE in 2024”

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The engagement between military experts, academic leaders, industry innovators, and technology providers emerged as an invaluable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practice, and the exploration of cutting‐edge solutions. The collective efforts invested in analysing the various dimensions of vertical manoeuvre significantly enhanced our understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by mountain warfare.

I express my gratitude to every participant, speaker, organizer, and contributor for their unwavering commitment, passion, and valuable contributions to the success of the Congress.
The dedication and expertise displayed have been instrumental in shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the intricacies involved in operating in challenging
mountainous landscapes.

2. 02 - Mastering the Art of Mountain Warfare: Navigating Challenges and Embracing Triumph

COL Italo Spini, ITA (A); NATO MW COE Deputy Director/COS

From a Mountain Warfare Chief of Staff Perspective, the Congress on vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare emerged as a pivotal and comprehensive gathering, bringing together a diverse array of experts and professionals. This assembly proved instrumental in delving into the unique challenges and potential opportunities that characterize military operations in mountainous terrain. Throughout the extensive presentations and nuanced discussions, a multitude of novel perspectives came to the fore, shedding light on the intricate nuances of tactics and strategies essential for achieving success in these complex environments.

At the heart of these deliberations was the pivotal role played by the Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MW COE). Acting as a nexus for endeavours aimed at standardizing procedures, the Centre is poised to address the prevailing diversity in approaches. It stands as a cornerstone for providing a unified and clear vision for the future of mountain warfare over the next two decades. By consolidating best practice and honing specialized training programmes, the Centre aims to foster a harmonized approach to mountain warfare, thereby enhancing interoperability among military forces engaged in such operations.

The Congress even served as a crucial forum for addressing not only the tactical and
strategic aspects, but also the intricate challenges posed by logistics in mountainous terrain. The discussions highlighted the unique logistical hurdles that military operations encounter in such environments, where rugged topography and extreme weather conditions add layers of complexity.


In this context, the MW COE emerges as an essential hub, not only for refining combat techniques but also for devising innovative logistical solutions. The need to standardize and optimize logistical procedures in mountain warfare was highlighted as a key priority. The MW COE, through collaborative efforts, seeks to develop streamlined logistical approaches that account for the demanding nature of mountainous terrain, ensuring the timely and efficient deployment of resources. These discussions, encompassing supply chain management, transportation, and resource allocation, contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the multifaceted logistical demands associated with mountain warfare.

The Congress also presented a unique and invaluable opportunity to engage in high‐level discussions with commanders of NATO mountain units and leaders of military mountain schools. This collaborative dialogue not only facilitated the exchange of ideas but also played a pivotal role in fostering a comprehensive understanding of the diverse challenges faced by practitioners of mountain warfare.


In conclusion, the next Congress, entitled “Mountain Warfare in 2040”, represents an exciting challenge as we collectively chart a course towards the future, envisioning the landscape of mountain warfare two decades hence. The MW COE stands as a beacon, guiding the way towards standardized practices, collaborative knowledge exchange, and a unified vision that will undoubtedly shape the trajectory of mountain warfare for years to come.

3. 03 - Facts and Figures of the 5th NATO Mountain Warfare Congress

LTC Tomaž Pavlič SVN (A): MW COE

The NATO MW COE organized the 5th Mountain Warfare (MW) Congress, dedicated to Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare, from 2-6 October 2023, in Brdo, Slovenia.

The 5th MW Congress was part of a series of annual events organized under the auspices of the MW COE on topics related to mountain warfare. Encouraged by the success of the previous MW Congresses and positive feedback from the Community of Interest, the MW COE continued with these activities in 2023.

At this MW Congress more than 130 participants heard an ensemble of speakers ranging from mountain unit experts in vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare to military and civilian scientists. Real life cases presented different nations’ experiences of their preparation processes for mountain warfare. To open the Congress, COL Leon Holc, the Director of the MW COE, and LT GEN Ignazio Gamba, the Commander of the Alpine Troops Command, set its general frame and context; then speakers and experts from different nations and specified domains demonstrated both the military and civilian points of view, thus enabling the participants to reach their own conclusions on their responsibility in real military work as decision-makers.

The basic ambition of the Congress was to provide the Community of Interest with recognized deeper knowledge and real-life expertise in vertical manoeuvre. In addition, a short field exercise demonstrated the specific requirements of vertical manoeuvre in mountain warfare, such as different movement techniques in mountainous terrain and logistical support in such environment.

Participants

 total of 133 representatives from 2 non-NATO (Austria, Georgia) and 19 NATO countries (Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) participated in the Congress, representing different commands and units, MW training and civilian educational institutions, Centres of Excellence and mountaineering organizations. During the Congress the activities were conducted by 22 speakers, a moderator and more than 60 representatives from 28 companies as part of the Industry Day.

4. 04 - Vertical Manoeuvre link with ATP 3.2.1.3 Definition

5. 05 - Vertical Manoeuvre link with MW Concept 0.9

LTC Miha
Kuhar, SVN (A)

NATO
Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence

Head of
the Concept Development and Experimentation Branch

LTC Miha Kuhar (Slovenian Armed Forces) is currently posted to the MW COE as Head of the Concept Development and Experimentation Branch. For more than 25 years he has carried out various tactical duties in mountain units and at the Mountain School of the Slovenian Armed Forces. He has spent a few years in peacekeeping operations and missions abroad. He disseminates his vast experience and knowledge as a lecturer, instructor, publicist and screenwriter of mountain education films.

Email: miha.kuhar@mwcoe.org

Summary

The aim of this article is to explain vertical manoeuvre in a mountainous environment from the perspective of the Mountain Warfare Concept. In November 2022, the MW COE completed the final draft of the NATO Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept (MWCC), and in February 2023 it was signed by COS SHAPE and COS HQ SACT. The aim of the MWCC is to unify the understanding of the importance of the mountain environment from a military point of view, and to set guidelines for how NATO land forces will function in the mountains under the combined arms approach and as part of joint forces. The purpose of the MWCC is to:

  1. Address the mountainous environment and its military implications;
  2. Describe the characteristics and abilities of MW;
  3. Formulate the capabilities and requirements of MW;
  4. Recommend actions to implement these capabilities;
  5. Develop a framework for future MW considerations.

Introduction

First, let us look at the definitions of three words related to the word vertical: mountainous terrain, cliff and gorge. According to the ATrainP-6 definition, the main characteristic of mountainous terrain is a slope inclination of more than 15 degrees.

In the Oxford Dictionary a cliff is defined as a high area of rock with very steep sides,  and a gorge is a deep, narrow valley with steep sides. In all three terms it is clear that we are talking about the third dimension, even if that vertical dimension is not explicitly mentioned.

In connection to the vertical dimension, the MWCC distinguishes between the air-ground and ground dimensions. In a mountainous environment mobility is limited, and manoeuvrability, firepower and ground forces must be reinforced by air support, artillery, air defence, MILENG and extra logistical support. In this case vertical manoeuvre is an important support element to the ground forces. For land forces, mountains are basically a natural barrier with a vertical dimension, which require specially trained and equipped units. The air-ground dimension is the relation between the two services. We understand the vertical ground dimension more as a natural obstacle and barrier.

In the MWCC the vertical dimension is mentioned in Annex A – Mountain Warfare Capabilities and Requirements. There is a requirement that land forces in the mountainous environment are:

“Capable of movement and manoeuvre in mountainous and compartmentalized terrain in all weather conditions and snow-covered terrain including the provision of MILENG support to mobility, counter mobility and survivability. This capability requires all-terrain and all-weather mobility including the execution of vertical manoeuvre. The integration of the third dimension of vertical manoeuvre will be crucial to ensure mobility and manoeuvrability in the mountains. By using the vertical manoeuvre of ground forces, combat and logistic support provided through the vertical manoeuvre will increase the combat power of ground forces.”

Air/Land Domain Intersection

Establishing air superiority is the first and most important effect that airpower provides for the land domain and overall joint force. Air domain control is a prerequisite to enabling the ground scheme of manoeuvre. Once access to the land domain has been achieved, precision fires are an essential element for achieving a joint force commander’s manoeuvre objectives. Joint airpower assets have the capability of directly attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity. If the centre of gravity is an enemy land formation, air and land assets can work to destroy it. In addition, air power’s flexibility makes it easier to attack soft targets to achieve follow-on effects in other domains.

Multi-Domain Operation in the Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan from September to November 2020. Retired US Colonel John Antal wrote in his book, “7 Seconds to Die”, that the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was the first war decided by autonomous weapons, and was a multi-domain operation. In this war, Azerbaijan dominated land, air, cyber, and space. Armenia quickly lost air domain; they fought in the land and cyber domains, but never dominated a single domain. Azerbaijan commanded the land, air, space, and cyber domains for decisive moments during the first two weeks of the fighting to degrade Armenian air defences, and this gave Azerbaijan air superiority over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the first phase of the operation, Azerbaijan focused on the disintegration of key Armenian networks and systems, primarily by flying robotic combat systems – unmanned arial systems (UASs), loitering munitions (LMs), and ISR unmanned arial systems. On the morning of September 27, the Armenian side lost 50% of its anti-aircraft forces and 40% of its artillery in 15 minutes.

The 2nd phase in the Azerbaijani plan was to find, fix, track and destroy targets within the AOR. In this new war Azerbaijani executed a “deep battle” with a new concept –robotic systems to attack Armenian positions everywhere in the AOR. The first two phases established the decisive conditions for the final ground mountain operation, and top attack was the decisive method of engagement.

The MWCC pointed out that “the use of Unmanned Air/Ground Vehicles (UAV/UGV) will bring a new functional approach to operating in the mountains. In particular, their use allows access to unreachable areas, improves persistent surveillance, endurance communications coverage and the extent of a communication range, contributes to the coordination of fire support and ensures cheaper automated logistics deliveries”.

However, in the mountainous environment there is a significant weather and climate impact on military operations. The matrix below simulates how weather affects winter operations in mountains in a multi-domain environment. On the one hand, weather can be an obstacle to operations, but on the other it can be also an opportunity for camouflage and masking.

Conclusion

One of the options to ensure the ability to manoeuvre decisively against enemy multi-domain effects is to amass superior manoeuvre capabilities. In defence, air-mobile tactics can help commanders limit the tactical risk by enabling friendly force dispersion until offensive capability is required. When offensive capability is needed, air-mobile forces can mass rapidly and cross the harsh impassable mountainous terrain, to penetrate enemy lines in the third dimension with fewer natural obstacles than land forces on the ground. Dispersion, fast concentration, and rapid power projection across vast distances are the advantages that define air mobility and vertical manoeuvre.

The ability to see, decide, and engage in multiple domains, and dominate the ones that matter during decisive periods, is the essence of warfare in the 21st century. Operating in all domains does not guarantee success, but it provides significant advantages. Cross-domain manoeuvre along the five domains provides the concentration of power on the adversary’s centre of gravity.

Sources:

  • MW COE, Mountain Warfare Capstone Concept, NOV 2022
  • NATO, AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, FEB 2022
  • NATO, AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, FEB 2022
  • NATO, ATP-3.2.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Operations, FEB 2022
  • Antal J., 7 Seconds to Die, Casemate Publisher, 2022
  • NATO, AAP 06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2021
  • NATO, AtrainP-6 Mountain Warfare Education and Training, Edition A, Version 1, NOV 2020
  • Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2000

6. 06 - Vertical Manoeuvre from a historicalpoint of view

MMag. Stefan Kurz,

AUTResearch Assistant to the DirectorMuseum of Military History 

Military History Institute, ViennaEmail: s.kurz@hgm.at

Stefan Kurz studied history and political science at the University of Vienna. He was a reserve officer (air defence) in the Austrian Armed Forces; since 2015, research assistant at the Museum of Military History – Military History Institute, Vienna; since 2020, provenance researcher of the museum and member of the Austrian Commission of Provenance Research; co-curator of several exhibitions. His research focus is the Austro-Hungarian armed forces up to 1918 and the Austrian Armed Forces of the First Republic (1918-1938), military diplomacy, museum history and provenance research.

Summary

After a brief overview of warfare in the mountains, the author discussed the emergence of specialized mountain troops in the second half of the 19th century, and then gave an insight into the mountain warfare of the First World War on the Italian front. The fighting in the western section of the front in South Tyrol was examined in more detail using several case studies. Based on these combat examples, historical lessons were derived that to a certain degree can still be relevant to military operations in high mountain terrain today.

Historical Evolution of Vertical Manoeuvre Capabilities/Mountain Warfare Mountain Warfare in History

The late director of the Austro-Hungarian War Archives and military writer, Major General Emil Woinovich, stated, in a study guide for the Austro-Hungarian general staff training published in 1901, that “high mountain areas and heavily forested low mountain ranges are not suitable for major warfare“. This viewpoint had a long tradition and was still widespread in military circles up to the First World War. In fact, there were practically no extended military operations in high mountains until the First World War. Where special alpine achievements in the history of warfare were claimed, it was mainly mountain crossings that were meant. This is true for famous military operations in mountainous terrain such as the crossing of the Hindu Kush by Alexander the Great, the crossing of the Alps by Hannibal in 218 BC, the crossing of the Lessinian Alps by the Imperial Commander Prince Eugene in 1701, and the operations in Switzerland under the command of the Russian general Suvorov in 1799 or Napoleon in 1800. The movements were largely confined to existing roads and paths, and fighting took place primarily in the passes and valleys. Extensive fighting in the mountain terrain itself did not occur away from the roads and valleys.

However, the second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of permanent specialized mountain troops. This development originated in Italy. It was here that the Italian government first established mountain troops in 1872 – the famous Alpini. As the formations were recruited territorially in the mountain regions of northern Italy, they were originally supposed to protect the mountain passes. In the following years, however, they were greatly expanded. The number of companies grew to 78 before 1914. After mobilization, in May 1915, there were as many as 179 companies in 52 battalions. From 1874 onwards, this force had its own mountain artillery, and at the end of the 19th century, the first ski training began. The original focus of the Alpini was initially the border with France, and only later the passes to the Habsburg Monarchy. Accordingly, France followed suit with the formation of its own mountain troops, the “Chausseurs Alpins” in 1888, which had reached the size of 20 battalions by 1912. Italy and France thus clearly played a pioneering role in the creation of dedicated mountain troops.

Mountain Troops in the Habsburg Monarchy

In contrast, the development in the Habsburg Monarchy, which had undoubtedly the highest share of mountains of the European great powers, appears surprisingly delayed. There had been formations of the non-standing army recruited from mountain regions since the 16th century, whose members therefore had a familiarity with the mountains. But even the famous Tyrolean Kaiserjäger regiment, which was permanently established in 1813, were no mountain troops and had no in-depth mountain training or mountain equipment.

In 1863, a mountain artillery regiment was formed for the first time. The first steps towards forming infantry troops capable of mountain combat were taken in the 1870s in connection with the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian troops were confronted with mountainous and impassable terrain. Based on the experience gained, so-called mountain brigades were created, which had some special features and were supposed to take into account the mountainous terrain in terms of equipment and organization.

The mountain brigades were large units that, similar to modern brigades, were capable of independent combat of combined arms, taking into account that in difficult terrain the connection with the higher command levels and other units could be impaired. Each of these brigades had only five battalions, unlike outside the usual regimental framework of the time. In addition, there were two mountain batteries each, which had special mountain artillery material that could be loaded on pack animals. Liaison elements were also particularly strong, with field telephones, telegraph, and optical signalling equipment available. Mountain radio stations were only being tested on the eve of the First World War. The mountain brigades also had their own engineer companies and more extensive medical equipment than was usual for infantry brigades. The equipment was also better at the supply level. For transport, the mountain brigades relied on pack animals instead of horses and carts.

However, these mountain brigades had no high-altitude training and no winter mountain training or equipment. The soldiers’ personal equipment did not differ from that of other soldiers. They were therefore not mountain combat brigades in the modern sense. Although skiing and winter mountaineering training was introduced informally into the Austro-Hungarian Army at the end of the 19th century, it was not until 1906 that it established real mountain troops, when three mountain regiments were initially formed within the framework of the Imperial-Royal Landwehr.

These were two Tyrolean “Landesschützenregimenter” (“Kaiserschützenregimenter” from 1917 onwards) and the Carinthian Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 4 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 1 from 1917 onwards). In 1909 a third “Landesschützenregiment” was added, and in 1911 in Ljubljana the Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 27 (“Gebirgsschützenregiment” No. 2 from 1917 onwards) was established, which was recruited mainly from Slovenes.

In the training of the new mountain troops, great importance was attached to the independence of the companies. In peacetime, the companies were garrisoned in their intended areas of operation and carried out intensive and realistic training. Specialized mountain training included climbing, ice and skiing courses. Civil high alpinists often acted as instructors, and only officers with a private passion for the mountains were assigned. Individual equipment met the most modern standards of the time. As with the mountain brigades, transport and supply were based on pack animals, and while the Landesschützenregimenter had no artillery at regimental level, the individual battalions were equipped with MGs from 1907. They were thus more powerful than entire infantry regiments of the regular troops. The total number of these genuine mountain troops, regardless of their quality, was 16 battalions in 1914, only about a third as large as that of Italy.

Mountain Warfare on the Italian Front in the First World War

The First World War was the first war in world history in which large-scale operations took place in mountain terrain, and in which real front lines in the high mountains were established and maintained permanently. All in all, the mountain warfare fronts reached a total length of 9,700 km; not only on the Italian front in Tyrol, Carinthia and the Karst region, but also in the Carpathians, in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Caucasus, Persia, Asia Minor and the Vosges. For the first time, fighting took place over longer periods of time in snow up to 10 m high, in cold temperatures ranging from -10 to -46 degrees, and at altitudes of up to 4,000 metres. This was most pronounced on the Austro-Hungarian South-Western front – the Italian front.

The Italian Front stretched over approximately 650 km and was characterized by particularly mountainous terrain. This ranged from 3,900 m high positions in the Ortler Group in the west of South Tyrol to the Kolovrat Ridge and Monte Sabotino on the edge of the Gorizia Basin. Although the Italian centre of attack was near Gorizia and in the Karst, the highest and most inhospitable mountain regions also quickly became a combat zone. Mountain warfare was especially extensive on the front in South Tyrol and Trentino. Here the Tyrolean Defence Command had to defend about 350 km of front line.

Only gradually did continuous positions emerge in the high mountains, even if in some places it continued to be the case that only individual peaks and positions were occupied. Often the forces of nature remained the greatest challenge and threat. Two-thirds of all casualties were caused by the environmental conditions. The soldiers not only had to contend with difficult terrain, but also with snow and extreme temperatures from October up to April or May. Sickness, frostbite, malnutrition, dysentery, falling rocks and falls from heights all caused casualties.

During the winter months, more soldiers were killed by avalanches than by enemy action. The number of avalanche deaths on both sides over the course of the war is still contested; the numbers given range from 10,000 to 80,000 killed. However, in the Austro-Hungarian army alone, more than 350 incidents with fatalities were registered, and in the first two of the three wartime winters the Austro-Hungarian army lost 4,529 soldiers due to avalanches on the Italian front. The “catastrophic winter” of 1916/17 was particularly hard. The number of Austro-Hungarian avalanche deaths was almost 3,300. In total 35,000 men are said to have been lost on the Austro-Hungarian side during the winter months due to weather and environmental influences such as avalanches, exhaustion and frostbite.

Caverns and tunnels were an important element of warfare in the high mountains, especially in those areas that were visible to the enemy. Tunnels were dug for different purposes – fighting tunnels, supply tunnels and accommodation tunnels. In the Adamello-Presanella group, for example, 24 km of underground tunnels were dug on the Austro-Hungarian side. On the Marmolata, based on an idea of Ingenieur Leo Heindl, the famous ‘ice city’ was built, a battalion camp of caverns and tunnels completely dug into the glacier with a total length of 10 km. It offered protection from shelling and the weather and ensured constant temperatures.

Despite great alpine achievements and successful attacks in detail, neither side was able to achieve operationally effective breakthroughs, as the terrain and fortifications made it possible to quickly reestablish an effective defence after abandoning a position. Both sides therefore attempted to collapse enemy positions by using mines. Thirty-three such actions are known; sometimes they buried hundreds of soldiers at once.

Because of these arduous conditions and the bitter winter, the time window for military operations of a larger extent was limited to a few months. However, real mass battles were fought in the high mountains as well, for example on Monte Ortigara where 22,000 Italians and 9,000 soldiers from Austria-Hungary were killed or wounded in June 1917. These battles were by no means only fought by proper mountain troops. Soldiers from all regions of the Habsburg Monarchy were deployed in the mountains.

A special challenge was the supply of the troops in the high mountains. This had to be carried out by pack animals and porters. On the Austro-Hungarian side, Russian or Serbian prisoners of war were often used as porters. Because of the lack of pack animals, the Austro-Hungarian forces also intensified the use of cable cars as a means of transport. By autumn 1918, 1,735km of cableways had been built by the Austro-Hungarian army.

For the soldiers, in any case, deployment in the high mountains often meant that they not only had to endure severe cold, but also that rations often failed to arrive or arrived only cold, and that amenities such as newspapers or field post only occasionally made it to the more remote positions. Despite the lower intensity of fighting than on the Isonzo, the battles in the mountains also cost the lives of about 150,000 to 180,000 Italian and Austro-Hungarian soldiers during the course of the war.

In general the theatre of operations of warfare in the high mountains was – according to the famous alpinist Herman Czant – characterized by four features: scarcity of resources, a small number of paths, difficulty of movement, and unexpected occurrence of severe natural events.

Warfare in the high mountains therefore exhibited the following features:

  1. Whoever took a summit position first could rarely be driven away from it.
  2. There was only a small period of time during which weather or snow conditions made it possible to carry out combat activities on a larger scale. From September onwards, the onset of winter was to be expected.
  3. Attacks were more effective in bad weather, so that the opponents could be approached as invisibly as possible.
  4. Attacks were often conducted through rock and ice walls, while enemy crews were held down by supporting fire. This was followed by hand-to-hand combat at close range and by all possible means.
  5. Repairs, and the construction and extension of positions and connections of all kinds – paths, cableways, and telephone lines – were mostly carried out during the summer.
  6. From September to May, the focus was on the struggle for survival, especially against masses of snow. Constant shovelling of the access routes was necessary to avoid burial. When the connection with cable cars and field telephones broke down, supply was particularly demanding.
  7. If a position was abandoned in winter, the enemy could occupy it as soon as the weather improved, because of the proximity of the enemy positions in the mountains.

The Symmetry of Mountain Warfare and the Difficulty of Operational Significance: Examples of Engagements and Combat in the Ortler Region

The western parts of the mountain fronts of Tyrol and Trentino, which were considered to be of secondary importance from a military point of view, were of particular significance from an alpinist perspective. Here were the highest combat fronts of mankind, with mountain ridges of 3,000-4,000 metres above sea level. Here was the longest ropeway of mountain warfare, with 20 kilometres as the crow flies between Carisolo and the Caré alto, and here were the highest altitude battles and the most extensive glacier battles in spatial and temporal terms. Even more than in other regions, a particular challenge was coping with the special environmental conditions. 

The use of troops trained and equipped for high mountain operations on both sides often meant that a tactical advantage gained through a single successful action was quickly offset by an equivalent reaction. The result was a constellation of symmetry which caused the fronts to stabilize and solidify, and which could only be overcome temporarily. This was evident, for example, around the Ortler. Its summit was occupied for the first time by Austro-Hungarian troops in 1916, namely by the High Mountain Company No. 30, which was mainly composed of Kaiserschützen.  From the summer of 1916, a permanent position existed on the summit of the Ortler, which also became the highest position of the World War and was equipped with field telephone lines and a three-week emergency supply. At the same time, the first two guns, two old mountain M.99 guns without recoil buffers, were brought up to an Ortler pre-summit at 3864 m, which thus became the highest artillery position of WWI. The Italians responded by occupying the Trafoier Eiswand (Cima di Trafoi), the Thurwieser and Ortler passes, and by extending the position on the Hochjochgrat. They also brought a machine gun into position on the Thurwieserspitze (Punta Thurwieser), which threatened the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Kleineiskogel (Cima della Vedretta Piccola). The Ortler guns then took up the fight against this MG and successfully knocked it out. The conquest of the Cima di Trafoi by the Italians was thus an outstanding military and alpine achievement, but operationally it could not be exploited to its full extent.

The events around the Königsspitze (Gran Zebru) were similarly dialectical and symmetrical. The Italian army prepared an attack on the 3851 m high peak, as it was in a strategically important position from which the supply routes of the Ortler front could be observed. The Austro-Hungarian troops therefore reinforced the garrison on the Königsspitze and extended the positions on the Königsjoch (Passo della Bottiglia) in front. The Italians worked their way up to these, with the two forces facing each other at 150 m and machine guns from both sides controlling the intermediate terrain between the positions. Despite constant fighting, neither side managed to gain sufficient superiority to turn the situation in its own favour until the end of the war.

Both armies therefore tried to introduce new combat methods to break the symmetry. While on other fronts in Tyrol tunnels were dug under enemy-occupied peaks and summits in order to bring them down with mines, on the Ortler front ‘attack’ tunnels were increasingly built. This was the case for the first time during the attack on the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo). The plan for this came from the creator of the ‘ice city’ under the Marmolata, Leo Handl. Construction began in October 1916. The crews each spent six days digging before they were relieved. They worked in extreme temperatures and poor air conditions and had hardly any natural light during the six-day period. The work continued until March 1917, when the construction of a second tunnel began. Before this was even finished, the Italians had become aware of the work and began to advance into the first tunnel. It was only by chance that this was recognized by the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, who reacted immediately and without hesitation attacked the Italian soldiers. Via a niche in the snow tunnel, the Tyroleans were able to dig a second tunnel exit with their bare hands and take the surprised Alpini in the back, thus capturing the Hohe Schneid (Monte Cristallo).

When the three factors of weather, surprise and coordination of the attacking elements were fulfilled, both sides were repeatedly able to achieve limited success despite the symmetry. A good example of this is the conquest and recapture of Punta San Matteo. With simultaneous attacks in the Adamello group, at the Tonale Pass and in the Southern Ortles group against the Punta San Matteo, the Italian army tried to achieve the conditions for a breakthrough against the Val di Sole and Val di Non, and subsequently the Adige Valley, beginning on 12 August 1918. During the night of 13 August 1918, heavy snowstorms raged, and the Austro-Hungarian mountain troops and mountain guides felt that an enemy attack was impossible in these conditions. Nevertheless, around 100 Alpini, under Captain Aldo Berni, attacked the Austro-Hungarian positions on the Punta San Matteo from the Gaviapass and the Dosegú glacier between 1am and 2am, silently taking the field guards by surprise and holding down the entire garrison of High Mountain Company 21 with hand grenades in their caverns. Subsequently, the daring Alpini advanced along the ridge and also managed to capture Monte Mantello and Villacorno.

An immediate counterattack was not possible for the Austro-Hungarian troops, due to the weather conditions and lack of resources. The positions taken at Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello had an essential function in the Southern Ortles Group. If they were captured by Italian troops, they allowed sight into the Val Monte and thus also the shelling of the supply routes there. In addition, an attack on Monte Giumella, the last support of the Austro-Hungarian position in the Southern Ortles, was imminent. If this peak also fell, the position on the Tonale was under threat from the rear. There was thus an acute need for action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian army. For the recapture, the Imperial and Royal 22nd Rifle Division provided the 3rd Company, and the half MG Company of the Assault Battalion 22 came from the Imperial and Royal 44th Rifle Brigade. It took about 14 days to assemble the necessary forces. The commander of the High Mountain Company No. 30, Captain Luis Molterer, who had already been responsible for the occupation of the Ortler in 1916, was tasked with working out ‘Operation Chamois’.

The goal was the recapture of Punta San Matteo and Monte Mantello. Captain Molterer had highly specialized and powerful troops at his disposal. The core was formed by the 3rd Company of Assault Battalion 22, composed of Kaiserschützen. These assault troops (Sturmtruppen) were excellently trained elite troops, specializing in close combat with hand grenades, highly motivated and exceptionally physically capable. Further elements came from the 21st and 30th High Mountain Companies and the Mountain Guide Company 2. A total of 150 men with ten machine guns were planned for the attack itself. In a second wave to secure the captured positions, Mountain Guide Company 11 and the remaining elements of Mountain Guide Company 2, High Mountain Company 21 and High Mountain Company 30, the Mountain Canon Battery on the Giumella and machine guns were provided. Plunging artillery fire was to provide the combat support element. For this purpose, a 30.5 cm M.16 mortar and 28 howitzers with 22,000 rounds were assembled. Communication was to be ensured by carrier pigeons, telephone, radio, light signals, flares and detectors. An ice cavern on the Giumella was set up as the attack start position, and all reinforcement and supply activities for the attack were carried out at night.

The attack formation was divided into two groups under the command of Kaiserjäger First Lieutenant Franz Tabarelli of Assault Battalion 22: one group was deployed under Tabarelli against Punta San Matteo, and the second under First Lieutenant Wilhelm Lička was to recapture Monte Mantello. Each of these groups had an assault platoon, a platoon of a high mountain company, and a heavy MG half platoon. The 1st Group also had a light MG half platoon, while the 2nd Group had a mountain guide patrol. Six heavy machine guns on the Corni Del Morto ridge were to support the attack. Meanwhile, on the Italian side, 57 guns were available in the area, which suggested an Italian intention to attack.

Bad weather and snowfall delayed the start of the attack for several days. After the weather had improved on 3 September 1918, the attack began in such a way that the infantry forces could advance at dusk and the defence in the newly won positions could take place at nightfall. A one-hour artillery preparation was to begin at 6 pm. The 30.5 cm mortar scored a direct hit on the enemy position. The intensity of the artillery fire is said to have lowered the summit of Punta San Matteo by 6 metres. The 1st Group evaded the Italian artillery barrage with shrapnel over the northern slope.  Fog favoured the approach. After about half an hour, Punta San Matteo was captured and 50 prisoners brought in. Only ten minutes later, massive Italian drumfire began on Punta San Matteo, but there was no counterattack.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Group, under First Lieutenant Lička, had to advance against Monte Mantello on the most difficult terrain. According to the order, this had to be done over the summit of Punta San Matteo and past the 1st Group.  Lička, however, when already on the way to the Punta San Matteo, ordered a swing away onto the ice wall of the Matteo south face, since enemy artillery fire was particularly heavy on the west ridge of Punta San Matteo. There it was difficult to find cover or avoid the fire. The ice wall had an inclination of 50 degrees over a width of 500-600 metres. The brigade’s official alpine advisor had stated that it was completely hopeless to proceed via this route; First Lieutenant Lička nonetheless took the decision on his own responsibility. The mountain guides of the group had to beat a total of 600 ice steps for the subsequent troops. This work took about 50 minutes, while forward movement stalled in the middle of the technically difficult ice wall.

In the meantime, the 1st Group had taken Punta San Matteo and counterfire began. The resulting rockfalls hit the 2nd Group, killing numerous soldiers, including the MG half platoon and the medical squad, and thus critical assets. The time schedule could no longer be kept, and the supporting artillery fire had to be extended by 30 minutes. The mountain guide squad penetrated the enemy position first and took an unoccupied MG. The support of two MGs from Punta San Matteo and the well-placed artillery fire finally enabled the assault soldiers and high-altitude soldiers to take the summit of Monte Mantello in close combat. By 20:30, Monte Mantello was taken.

Essential to the success of the attack was the obstruction of the Italian artillery observers’ vision by fog, and the surprise caused by the approach over the Matteo south face, which was considered impassable. The decisive factor was the coincidence that the Italian crew of the MG on the south slope had not manned their gun and did not recognize the approach. Otherwise, the entire 2nd Group could have been wiped out in the middle of the ice wall during their difficult advance. Another important factor was the support provided by the well-placed plunging fire. Advantageous weather conditions and the associated surprise effect, as well as good coordination with the artillery and between the attacking units, and great speed were thus decisive for the success of this and many other high-alpine attack actions.

The implication of this tactical success at the operational level lay in the prevention of far-reaching operational possibilities in the event of an Italian success. This again showed how difficult it was to exploit individual tactical successes at the operational level, and how much the defensive was favoured in the high mountains.

Conclusion Lessons from Mountain Warfare in the First World War

The necessarily sketchy discussion of mountain warfare in the First World War in general and on the Western Front of South-Tyrol and Trentino in particular in this article suggest some observations that could be considered as historical lessons that still hold some value for contemporary operations and manoeuvre in the mountains:

  • Implications of terrain and weather for the supply of troops: Harsh weather and adverse environmental conditions in the high mountains, difficult movement, and the early onset of winter made it necessary to exploit the short season of milder weather for the resupply of troops and the establishment of depots. Precautionary measures were necessary to enable the permanent occupation of positions even when supply lines were interrupted, which could not be avoided. All technical means available (such as special equipment for individual soldiers, cable cars, drilling machines etc.) had to be utilized and employed.
  • Effects of terrain on C3I: Difficult movement, the regular breakdown of communication, and impeded lines of sight due to the terrain meant that every dimension of C3I was more difficult to implement than in lower lying areas.
  • Increased responsibilities and capacities at lower levels of the hierarchy: The implications of terrain on C3I meant that lower levels of the military hierarchy – especially lieutenants and captains – had to assume more responsibility and self-reliance. It also meant that battalions, companies and improvised battle groups needed more means in terms of communication, fire support and supply than was otherwise customary at the time.
  • Significance of peaks in positional warfare: Once a peak was taken it was hard to drive the defenders from it. Peaks also often meant the control of valleys, since they allowed for sight and therefore the direction of artillery fire.
  • Advantages for the defenders (especially at the operational level): The difficulty of movement and C3I in mountainous terrain supported defence, and therefore it was easier to re-establish effective defensive positions once driven from another line of defence.
  • Prospects for the success of offensive action depended on surprise, speed and fire support: The strength of the defence in mountainous terrain and the advantages of positions on peaks made the skilful combinations of all three factors mandatory if an attack was to be successful.
  • Need for widespread dissemination of mountain warfare skills beyond specialized troops: Even in the high mountains, warfighting could not rely solely on specialized alpine troops. In order to achieve success not only at a narrow tactical level but at an operationally significant scale, forces had also to be involved which were not specialized mountain troops (such as in the Austro-Hungarian offensive ‘Avalanche’ in June 1918). Basic mountaineering skills had therefore to be disseminated beyond specialized troops.

7. 07 - Principles of parachuting in mountainous environments

1st SGT Markus Geist, DEU (A)

German Airborne School

Military Freefall Instructor

Alpine Army Specialist

Email: markus1geist@bundeswehr.org

Background

This presentation was designed to give a basic overview of airborne operations in a mountainous environment.

The presentation was intended to answer the following questions:

  • Which units are designated to paradrop in a mountainous environment? (Structure and particularities)
  • What are the challenges to paradrop in a mountainous environment? (weather, terrain, altitude)
  • What kind of training is required? (duration, structure)

If possible, I was asked to conclude the presentation with experiences (lessons learned) from exercises.

I therefore structured my presentation as follows:

  • Units designated for airborne operations in a mountainous environment;
  • Basics of airborne operations;
  • Challenges of airborne operations in a mountainous environment;
  • Training required;

Units designated for Airborne Operations in a mountainous environment

The units that can be designated for airborne operations in a mountainous environment must be defined by each nation. At present, in Germany, we have the following state of affairs:

  • Special Forces (Army / Navy / Airforce)
  • Long Range Reconnaissance
  • Airborne Troopers (Pathfinders / JTACs)
  • Mountain Troopers (Parts of: High Alpine (Reconnaissance) Platoon / Mountain Leader Teams / JTACs)

The requirement for units to be trained for airborne operations is constantly discussed and adjusted according to the current tactical and operational needs.

Basics of Airborne Operations

Airborne Operations can be divided into ‘static line’ and ‘freefall’ operations. Both can be conducted in daytime and at night.

In static line operations the parachutes are mostly round, not controllable, and are always released by a static line.

In freefall operations the canopies are rectangular, controllable, and are released by the jumper.

Freefall operations are again divided into Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) High Altitude High Opening (HAHO), High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) and Low Level (not included in the presentation, due to lack of time).

High altitude is defined as an altitude greater than flight level 120 (STANAG 7056), and it may be necessary for oxygen equipment to be used to prevent hypoxia and decompression sickness.

The main difference between the HAHO and HALO procedures is the duration of the freefall phase. In HAHO operations the parachute is opened shortly after exiting the aircraft, in contrast to a lower opening altitude in a HALO procedure.

Low level is a procedure where the aircraft approaches in proximity flight, pops up to exit altitude, drops the jumpers and dives off again.

Challenges of Airborne Operations in mountainous environment

For static line operations, the main challenge in mountainous terrain may be to find a suitable dropzone. In addition, the descent rate of the canopies increases with the elevation of the dropzone, and therefore the risk of jumpers getting hurt also increases.

Normally the mission planner is responsible for the calculation of the droppoint of the jumpers; the glide ratio, depending on wind data; the main heading; the setting of the automatic activation device (a device which releases the reserve canopy at a certain height above ground level, in case the jumper has passed out); and so on. A mountainous environment definitely makes these calculations a bigger challenge.

Since the jumpers must stabilize their freefall with all the equipment they have to bring to the ground, a high level of training in freefall is required, due to the bulky alpine equipment (especially skis).

The size of the Landing Zones can require single approaches by each jumper

In general, freefall jumpers can land in much smaller landing zones than static line jumpers, due to their controllable canopies. Normally freefall jumpers try to land in a team in close formation, following the team leader. In mountainous, and especially in high alpine terrain, the landing zones can be very small, and it may be safer if each jumper conducts a single approach, which requires a higher level of accuracy from the troopers.

Unpredictable wind conditions

In a mountainous environment, you may find cliffs, boulders and other obstacles in close proximity to the landing zone. These can cause local leeward, windward or thermal conditions that can change very rapidly and may make a quite easy landing zone a very difficult one for parachutists.

 

Training required

There are no rules as to what extent soldiers must be trained before jumping into a mountainous environment. However, it takes a larger training effort, and I would not recommend allowing inexperienced jumpers to jump into alpine terrain. The following is a rough recommendation:

  • Alpine skills, depending on terrain/task
  • Static line course
  • Level of freefall training: Team leader level (approximately 200 jumps / 50-100 jumps per year)
  • Special training for parachuting into a mountainous environment, provided by AUT / SUI / …?

 

Conclusion

Mountainous or higher alpine terrain makes an already risky and difficult means of insertion even more difficult.

  • It is a suitable option for bringing small to medium-sized units into mountainous terrain
  • Units should be ‘pre-selected’/specialized
  • High training effort

8. 08 - Joint Fire Support structure in mountain units

 

LTC Davide Pascoli, ITA (A)

Staff Officer MtnInfBn 232,

Military Mountain Leader – Tactics & Logistics Teacher

Italian Armed Forces

In mountain warfare operations, the mountain battery is the artillery organization most commonly used to provide FIRE SUPPORT to a Task Force or Battle Group (at the Battalion Level). A mountain battery operates independently and can provide a Fire Direction Centre (FDC) with the Firing Units (up to two artillery sections), the Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE), and up to three Joint Fire Support Teams (JFSTs). It is the organization that has the ability to deploy all the elements responsible for planning, coordinating and employing all the allocated assets for effective fire support. JFSTs serve as the SENSORS in manoeuvre, being the enablers of the FIND and FIX functions; the JFSE takes on the role of the C2 function, being the decision-maker of planning and coordinating the fire support; and the FDC implements the STRIKE function, responsible for calculating and delivering fire through the gun line.

 

In mountainous terrain, Indirect Fire Support requires multiple delivery platforms, such as artillery and mortars. Each of these platforms possesses varying firepower depending on the requirements of the battle and calibre specifications. For this reason, mountain artillery units have some features that differ from normal field artillery units: they embrace the MULTICALIBRE APPROACH, being trained to employ varied calibres and guns. This flexibility extends their effective firing range to 24 kilometres.

As an example, Italian Mountain Artillery is equipped with 3 different platforms:

  • 105/14 mm light howitzers, with a maximum range of 10 kilometres;
  • 120 mm Thompson mortars, with a maximum range of 13 kilometres;
  • FH 70 155/39 mm medium howitzers, with a maximum range of 24 kilometres.

Light howitzers, 105mm and 120mm mortars are essentials in mountain operations, thanks to their ability to employ a 1st and 2nd firing arc (low and high angle of fire). They are very effective because their trajectory enables them to engage targets on reverse slopes, to take over high mountains and to deliver fire into dead spaces and over intermediate crests. Their ability to use a high angle and rate of fire is suited to the support of dispersed forces. In addition, light artillery can be used as a source of direct fire for creating rock fragments or triggering avalanches for tactical purposes (i.e. counter-mobility) to block enemy approach or escape routes. Both of these assets can be easily towed or transported by air, enhancing unit mobility. They can be moved to their fire positions via air or ground, and by different means of transport such as helicopters, pack animals, cable cars or even by carriage. Medium artillery plays a strategic role, either guarding valley entrances or delivering DEEP fire to support deep manoeuvre tactics.

Mountain artillery units also employ ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES (such as the BV206 used by Italy) to maximize mobility in challenging terrain where conventional vehicles struggle. These vehicles can tow guns or howitzers with appropriate sleds, and establish Tactical Command Posts that align with manoeuvre requirements.

 

The challenges of reduced mobility and limited positioning areas in mountainous terrain can impact the availability of artillery fire support. The terrain promotes isolated battles which make the C2 function difficult, so small units often face ‘tactical independence’. To mitigate some of the limitations deriving from mountain terrain, and to better support isolated manoeuvre units, the artillery battery can be broken down into smaller platoons and directly embedded into manoeuvre units. This aligns with the MISSION COMMAND principle, crucial in mountain warfare operations, reflecting upon FS in terms of employment, operational autonomy and combined arms formations.

 

JFSTs, acting as forward observers of the firing battery (surveillance target acquisition crew), are embedded within manoeuvre units, often positioned near the enemy or within the forward edge battle area. Their primary task is to manage call for fires (both planned and unplanned), requesting, adjusting and controlling the fire delivered by the battery.

 

Joint capabilities are essential in mountain warfare, because CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK and AIR SUPPORT, in general, can be highly effective as terrain constraints also limit the enemy’s mobility. Furthermore, due to the particular nature of the terrain, Firing Units could face “NO FIRE AREAS” where ground fire support becomes ineffective. 

 

Qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) play a pivotal role in ensuring joint capabilities for JFSTs, working alongside laser operators, drivers/radio operators, and forward observers, as part of the same team. Their mobility and survivability in mountainous terrain are of paramount importance, often requiring the highest levels of advanced training in various specialized skills (combat-assault skills as well as mountaineering).

 

In addition to their core artillery competencies (as gunners, FDC, calculators, observers, and in mastering procedures), personnel in mountain artillery units must possess solid basic skills in mountain survival, combat, and mobility across icy, snowy, and rocky terrain. Specific branches or branch elements, like FST and FSE, may require individuals with advanced and expert-level knowledge and skills. Furthermore, JFST, given their frontline positions and exposure to combat, are strongly encouraged to undertake training in advanced special skills such as assault tactics, mountaineering, and assault-climbing. Collective training for mountain artillery units includes joint exercises and combined arms training events. Emphasis is placed on training in fire and displacement techniques to mitigate enemy counter-battery fires. Crew drills, including gun and mortar crews, are conducted in restrictive terrain conditions and adverse weather scenarios, including cold environments.

 

In conclusion, the combination of high mobility-multicalibre delivery platforms and well trained JFST allow Joint Fire Support in mountain units to be vital for achieving success in MWO. Through their adaptability, flexibility, and specialized training, mountain artillery units and their associated personnel play an indispensable role in providing the fire support necessary to overcome the challenges of mountainous terrain and ensure mission success in demanding environments.

9. 09 - Preparing for the fight

 

MSG Tim Roggatz, DEU (A)

2006-2017 Mountain Infantry Battalion 231 Bad Reichenhall (JTAC )

2017-2021 Air Ground Operations School Nancy-Ochey, France (JTAC-Instructor/Evaluator)

2021-2023 German Army SOF KSK Air Land Integration Cell (SOALI Planner/JTAC Instructor)

Email: ksktr009pn@bundeswehr.org

Summary

When we talk about Close Air Support (CAS) in Mountain Warfare, and especially about the specific challenges for a JTAC or any fire support element during the conflict in Afghanistan, we must first take a closer look at the fundamentals and definitions of CAS/JTAC, and carry out a basic terrain analysis of the Area of Operations (AOO).

1. Generalities

This will already give us the answer to many questions concerning the employment, integration, and general challenges for fire support, whether it is ground-based or air to surface fires.

CAS, by definition according to the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3321D, is an event which requires ‘detailed integration’, ‘hostile targets’ and ‘close proximity’ to friendly forces. Additionally, as is also defined by the ATP 3321, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is ‘qualified and certified’ according to ATP 3322 B, and is required to ‘direct the Air action’ against these ‘targets’.

This sounds generally logical and straightforward, but considering the environmental conditions, the frictions of war and other influences in the rough terrain of Afghanistan, it is everything but – not logical, and indeed not straightforward.

First of all, THE Afghan terrain and THE Afghan conflict do not exist. But most importantly, nor does THE solution for any problems for fire support that occurred during the period of more than 20 years when coalition forces served and fought in Afghanistan.

However, we should limit the experience we, and particularly I, had in that country to a specific time and region. Just to clarify that my experiences may or may not be completely different to what others might have experienced. The time and region I’m referring to are the ‘ISAF years’, especially the period between 2009 and 2014 – one of the deadliest periods of the whole conflict. The regions I’m referring to are the northern provinces of Afghanistan – Baghlan Province. Maybe not THE hotspot, compared to many other provinces. Maybe not the region with the highest peaks, the deepest valleys or the roughest environmental conditions, but, and this is in my opinion the most important thing, good enough to display and highlight all the important aspects and lessons learned for fire support in Afghanistan.

When talking about providing fire support, conducting CAS or simply analysing the challenges of these topics, what we should keep in mind at all times is the common guidelines, the tactical directives which applied at that specific period of the conflict. General Petraeus, COM ISAF, in his Tactical Directive from 2010, made a strong statement concerning COIN (counterinsurgency) operations: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the centre of gravity. Only by providing them with security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and lSAF prevail.” General Allen, COM ISAF, in 2011, in his Tactical Directive, even went a step further: “My intent is to eliminate ISAF-caused civilian casualties across Afghanistan, and minimize civilian casualties throughout the area of operations by reducing their exposure to insurgent operations.”

These two statements are a perfect example for guideline today. Winning hearts and minds and producing zero civilian casualties while conducting Close Air Support.
Once we begin to analyse the challenges and identify potential issues, we must always remember these two Directives.

2. General environmental challenges

So, what are the general challenges for fire support in Afghanistan? What first comes to my mind is the terrain and the weather. In my eyes these, beside all the other aspects which we will consider in this essay, are among the biggest troublemakers when implementing fire support, especially in close proximity to friendly forces. As mentioned above, the Baghlan Province is not the region with the highest peaks in Afghanistan, but with an average altitude of 600m above sea level and mountains up to 3000m, we already have the first indicator of what could possibly happen. This combination of low valleys, high ground, desert-like plateaus, and jungle-like ‘green zones’ around the main river lines crossing the province, provides perfect conditions for enemy forces, especially when dressed as common civilians, and for hideouts or ambush sites. To locate these hideouts and tunnel in the mountainous/desert terrain at a distance of up to several kilometres, or to locate enemy ambush sites during close combat situations in the ‘green zone’, where civilian infrastructure, trenches or any kind of revetments are used, are among the biggest challenges for fire support. It does not matter whether we are talking about CAS or any other indirect or direct fire from various ground-based fire systems.

The primary task of any JTAC and of any Forward Observer (FO), or whoever is in charge of directing the fire, is to identify the enemy’s location and to provide the accurate location to the appropriate supporting asset, of course always considering the movement and location of any coalition forces, and keeping in mind the guidelines, rules of engagement (ROE’s) and so on. According to ATP 3321D, target acquisition in mountainous terrain is one of the greatest challenges JTACs have to face. Poor maps, often old Russian maps from the past, and heavy target location equipment such as Laser Range finders were more or less useless due to the massive use of jamming systems, especially man-portable jamming systems, which were, compared to those used nowadays, not even close to modern man and convoy protection systems. Remember all this took place more than ten years ago.

That being said, the weather conditions were also not comparable to Central European standard weather. For sure infantrymen, and especially those who fight in the mountains, should be used to those weather conditions, but temperatures close to 50° Celsius in summer and minus 30° Celsius in winter are not the ideal conditions to fight against an enemy which is used to that climate. Nevertheless, operating during early mornings or at night was the weapon of choice, particularly for dismounted patrols during summertime. Poor Night Vision Devices did not make target acquisition easier for any fire support personnel.

As we can see, there were many different influences and general challenges for fire support personnel in those environmental conditions; the list goes on.
But let’s focus a little bit more on the challenges for JTACs.

3. Unique JTAC challenges in Mountain Warfare

Before we come up with further challenges, we should take a quick look at the main tasks of a JTAC during these years. Within the COIN scenario the core tasks of a JTAC could vary a great deal: from providing armed overwatch during mounted or dismounted patrols for friendly forces, to Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NTISR), to providing CAS for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The spectrum was as wide as the COIN mission itself.

One of the biggest challenges JTACs had to face during that period was the support to the ANSF. Often only connected via an interpreter on the phone, we tried to provide them with air power. Not having any situational awareness (SA) and not being in ‘close proximity’ to these forces made it very difficult to support them in an appropriate way. Most of the time, a picture from the targeting pod of the supporting aircraft was all we got, and even then, it was nearly impossible to define who was operating where on the battlefield.

The key phrase is ‘battle tracking’. It was not only with the ANSF that this caused several problems. Even with friendly or coalition forces, the use of marking devices was challenging. Combined patrols with other notions and different TTPs within the platoons and squads, and the variation in the length of convoys, sometimes up to kilometres, with different kinds of vehicle, number of soldiers and so on, clearly made it difficult to keep the overall SA at a high level. Especially in Troops in Contact (TIC) situations, the use of marking devices was essential to provide proper ‘target talk on’ for the aircrew and to enhance the SA for all the involved players. The use of coloured smoke during the day and infrared marking at night had a huge impact on the situation, significantly simplifying JTACs’ work.

Airborne-used markings, such as white phosphorus rockets, are also an appropriate tool, especially when aircrew has an increased SA compared to the JTAC on the ground. Aircrew can ‘mark’ enemy positions using these rockets, and the smoke will help friendly forces to identify the often well-covered enemy hideouts.

Proper ‘target talk on’, meaning to bring the eyes of the aircrew onto the correct spot, is also one of the challenges. We have already spoken about the environment. Traditionally the target talk on begins at a given ‘reference point’ (RP), which might be a prominent building, a significant road intersection, or just a single large tree standing in the middle of nowhere. But to find that ‘unique’ object in the middle of the desert or the jungle-like conditions of the green zone was not that easy. We may think of just providing proper coordinates, passing them to the aircraft, opening the targeting pod and away we go, but in an environment where friendly and coalition forces were using jamming systems, which had, by the way, a huge impact on the communication and video downlink (VDL), the use of optical devices to provide these coordinates was useless. Providing maps, in addition, were also no big help, because everything looked exactly the same: brown, green or grey with Cyrillic letters on it. So, whenever we stopped we took the time to switch off jamming systems and tried to ‘label’ the current area, in order to ease further target talk on between us and the aircraft, and also for upcoming events to already have something in hand, in case.

Back to our Afghan partners. The will to support them was one aspect; another aspect was the legal side of it. Different Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for the employment of CAS in support of the ANSF made it nearly impossible for us to support them in the way we were intended to. But not only that kind of support; the legal framework for the employment of CAS was also quite challenging. A variety of different ROEs, the necessity of providing positive identification (PID), a proper pattern of life (POL), taking in account the collateral and cultural concerns, and then requesting permission for the engagement at the right time to the correct agency made it nearly impossible to support the troops in an appropriate way, other than being under fire in a self-defence (SD) situation.

4. CAS in a multinational environment

National caveats were, in addition to the aforementioned challenges, also a big factor.
Dutch F-16s, for example, were only allowed to employ air to surface ammunition while in self-defence; JTACs were operating under the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom mandate; the list goes on.

In addition to the ‘official’ problems, we had to face a more unique challenge which popped up during the employments: the mindset and culture differences between the nations. Just imagine working closely together with a variety of partners from different nations, who all have their own interpretation of the term ‘self-defence’. It sounds funny, but it can lead to misunderstanding and complications. For example, a man with a rifle dressed in civilian clothes, walking on a path through the mountains, is not, in our German common way of understanding, a classic self-defence situation, but for other nations it may be. These situations appeared regularly, and showed just how difficult it can be to work in that kind of environment, with different nations and different ways of approach.

Last but not least, we must focus on one of the biggest challenges for any kind of fire support, especially in the mountainous environment, but actually in any environment: communication. Communication is the key to airpower. Without a solid communication plan there will be no Close Air Support, no fire support at all. To keep that communication up at a high level requires detailed integration of the JTAC into the support ground forces. An understanding, at all tactical levels, of the need of a solid communication plan and the needs of a JTAC is essential for mission success.

5. Lessons Learned

What are the Lessons Identified and the Lessons Learned from the ‘ISAF years’?
First of all, as previously mentioned: Communication.

‘No Comms – No CAS’.

This means that a proper PACE Plan for each and every mission is essential. Furthermore, a useful integration of jamming tools will ease the process of having stable comms between air and ground forces.

Using a massive number of jammers may provide the maximum amount of security, but may also lead to poor communication.

Integration is key. The use of liaison officers at all command levels is essential for the integration of air to surface assets.

Additionally, a command standard needs to be made. TTPs must be identical within coalition forces. Mass briefings, training and Rehearsal of Concept drills (ROC) can help to enhance the mission planning.

Back to the basics.

This is the major outcome and the key takeaway for me as a JTAC being deployed in a mountainous environment. The basics are essential. In an environment with rapidly changing weather conditions, with high peaks and deep valleys and an enemy and other coalition forces barely visible, we must go back to the basics. Use what you have – do not focus too much on ‘modern’ stuff. Train yourself in using map, compass and binoculars. Make yourself as familiar with the area as possible. Be in a physically good condition, and most of all prepare for every mission with 120%.

Always remember the five P’s: Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance.

10. 10 - Experience of JFS in exercises (‘Heimdall’, ‘Mountain Hornet’)

Maj. David Würtz                                                                                                        2019-             present Air Liasion Officer & JTAC-I/E MtInfBrig 23                              2021               JSOTF GAZELLE NIGER                                                                 2018               Transfer to Air Force                                                                       2014-2018     JTAC & Bn Fire Support Coordination Officer MtInfBn 232      2016               Staff Officer Course Army                                                    2005-2014     Officer Candidate and MtInf Officer                                2005               KFOR Prizren                                                                           2001-2005     Mountain Infantry (OR-1 to OR-6) and Pack Horse Company

Email: davidwuertz@bundeswehr.org

BACKGROUND

Introduction

The war in Ukraine shows once more that modern warfare relies on effective and readily available Fire Support. Not only the shelling of troops in fortified positions by the field artillery of the two opponents, but also, in particular, the target acquisition and guidance of precision strikes of rocket artillery and cruise missiles against high value targets such as supply trains and convoys, air defense and EW systems, and eventually command posts, characterize the war we are witnessing.

The extensive action of raid units in close cooperation with UAVs is also seen in the same conflict. Both the Russian Army and the Ukrainian forces inflict and suffer heavy losses with these tactics.

Most of the fire support is achieved by a mobile phone app and the support of Starlink satellites.

On the other hand, with the (most likely Russian-backed) Serbian escalation on the border with Kosovo, mountain warfare is once again to be considered.

If put together, the aforementioned high value targets (EW, SAM) will be found in proximity to the frontline, due to the nature of the mountainous terrain reducing the reach of line-of-sight systems. These targets will therefore be within reach of regular forces, such as mountain infantry with its reconnaissance teams, UAVs, snipers and JFSTs.

An effective network of sensors and effectors is therefore key to fast, precise and effective fire support.

Small units could be tasked with observing areas and supported by designated effectors in order to find and neutralize specific targets with minimum coordination efforts. Long range reconnaissance patrols, raid units, sniper teams and UAVs with the ability to call in precision strikes could also be sent into target areas of interest to achieve the same goal.

The digitalization of the battlefield is not only short of a big next step implicating digital systems for communication in order to direct fires, such as, for example, digital aided close air support. We are at the brink of a major revolution as the fifth generation fighter aircraft push forward the idea of a combat cloud and AI-enhanced automated fire support.

This is all to be considered when reading the following Lessons Learned from the exercises, with regard to joint fire support in mountain warfare.

The ‘HEIMDALL’ and ‘MOUNTAIN HORNET’ exercises

MOUNTAIN HORNET

As there are no exercises in mountain warfare with enablers like Joint Fire Support and reconnaissance elements as the main training audience, the air force liaison element of Mountain Infantry Brigade 23 (ALE X23) first created and conducted the MOUNTAIN HORNET exercise back in 2019. Since then, the exercise has taken place four times (2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023) in the Bavarian Alps, close to Salzburg. Each year has had a different focus, but fire support in mountain warfare has always been a central feature.

The participants comprise mountain infantry units, reconnaissance platoons, joint fire support teams, UAV squads, EW elements, pack horses, helicopters, military jets and contract air assets, as well as special forces.

As the exercise built up an international reputation, partnering nations like the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy have already sent forces to participate.

The exercise is divided into a training phase, a planning phase, and a 72-hour ongoing operation with opposing forces.

All the stated tactics and manoeuvres providing the following Lessons Learned have been tested and evaluated.

HEIMDALL

The German Navy pushed forward in the matter of Joint Fire Support exercises, creating HEIMDALL as a LIVEX including naval gunfire support, close air support and ground-based fire support in northern Norway.

HEIMDALL 2022 brought three German frigates, one Norwegian corvette, Alpha Jets and one tube 120mm mortars into action. Controlled by a Joint Fire Support Group (JFSCG), a Joint Fire Support Coordination Team (JFSCT), and three Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) consisting of mountain infantry and special operation forces.

The effort required to bring these three branches together in one live fire exercise in northern Norway in winter showed what potential, logistical and organizational challenges and training needs this cooperation implies.

Joint Fire Support in Mountain Warfare – Experiences from the MOUNTAIN HORNET and HEIMDALL exercises

Effects

Mountain terrain is characterized by steep slopes and large changes in elevation, and a mix of very short and far distant views. The weather changes quickly, sometimes within minutes, and so does the visibility if fog or clouds stream through the area.

This effects not only target acquisition and observation, but also devices using laser beams such as Laser Range Finders. Additionally, pilots inside a cockpit or aircraft sensors will regularly have trouble gaining ground visibility. If the surface can be observed by air platforms, mountainous areas mostly have a lack of distinctive terrain features, and peaks and summits often mask targets for manoeuvring aircraft, making visual targeting acquisition difficult and time-consuming.

In addition effects in mountainous terrain may often result in secondary weapon effects such as landslides or avalanches. These secondary effects are mostly difficult to predict and can affect both own troops and the enemy, and must be carefully considered.

Rocky terrain, as well as deep snow, can leave munitions useless, as cases and fuzes may break or the munitions may be absorbed before detonation, mitigating fragmentation and blast or even remaining unexploded.

Alpine terrain, with large rock formations, steep valleys, trenches and holes, shields the fragmentation and blast of ordnance. This results in the possibility of bringing own troops within dangerous close range without them being affected, but also the risk that the engaged targets maybe unaffected even with impacts in direct proximity.

The amount of employed ordnance will be significantly higher in mountain warfare to achieve the comparable effects in flat terrain. Fuse setting is a major consideration in fire support missions in alpine terrain.

Movement

Movement of troops, equipment and supply is a major challenge in mountain warfare. Rough terrain with large differences in elevation and steep cliffs, as well as extreme and swiftly changing weather conditions, influences movement and therefore complicates the planning and execution of operations.

In order to bring small teams, e.g. JFST, into impassable terrain to fulfil a specific task, insertion with freefall parachutes is a viable option. Due to unreliable weather conditions, contingency insertion is paramount. This affects the equipment of these forces, since exfiltration on foot must always be considered. Since jumping into unknown alpine terrain brings a marked risk of injury, the idea of inserting specialists via a tandem parachute jump is not to be recommended. This is especially the case where teams using parachute tactics would tactically jump in full gear, such as by night into the mountains. Perhaps ‘high exit high opening’ tactics with a long glide phase and a drop zone in a grassy valley or a large elevated pasture may work.

Modern warfare is most likely linked to extensive helicopter operations. Whenever the situation and weather allows, helicopters should be used to ensure rapid movement of troops and supply. Nevertheless, due to the impact of weather on helicopter operations, contingency planning is inevitable, and operations should be planned to be timely and flexible whenever possible in order to use time windows with favourable weather conditions.

As a consequence, JFSTs in mountain warfare must be physically robust and also require suitable equipment in order to survive alpine conditions. Furthermore, they need to be trained to move dismounted in challenging terrain, as helicopters may always be cancelled due to the weather. Deriving from this statement, equipment must be light and minimalistic.

Movement also includes the movement of ‘air-players’ like UAVs, helicopters and fighter jets. These players must share their airspace not only with each other, but also with mortar shells and missiles like Javelin or MELLS. As the terrain in the mountains naturally has a higher elevation above mean sea level (MSL), airspace with a top level given in MSL is smaller than in flat terrain. This sounds logical but is often overlooked in the planning phase. Higher airspace must be requested, since approving entities generally do not think of specialties in mountain warfare.

Communication

Communications with line-of-sight (LOS) radios are generally degraded and carry big challenges in mountain warfare. This is not the exemption but the norm in these operations. With weather and space weather influencing frequencies, and terrain naturally blocking the line of sight in the mountains, a detailed terrain and weather assessment in the planning phase must take place. This is a crucial point for a successful joint fire mission in mountain warfare.

To mitigate the disadvantageous factors, all available means of communication must be considered. Wherever possible, beyond line-of-sight radios, such SATCOM and HF Radios, should be implemented. For SATCOM, thorough planning, preparation and training of the operators is required. HF radios can help in bridging long distances. They should be operated to transmit data; transmission windows and an execution checklist help to minimize traffic.

Since JFSTs, snipers and reconnaissance squads regularly man elevated positions, equipping these forces with relay stations and allowing them to operate these should be considered. Mountain forces also should acquire UAVs, which can be operated as relays in order to optimize communication.

To counter all the aforementioned issues, and to minimize comms, a detailed fire support matrix should be created in order to ensure the concept of fires even with low comms by assigning effectors to sensors by task, phase or timing.

Sustainment

As mentioned in the Movement section, supply in mountain warfare requires a tremendous effort.

Resupply can be achieved by aerial resupply drops or helicopter supply lifts. These are again dictated by weather conditions.

For this reason, small teams serving as sensors for fire support in mountain warfare should carry 42 hours supply as standard to be self-sustaining and survive supply gaps due to unfavourable weather windows.

Helicopters or aerial resupply will not always be able to deliver directly to the troops in overwatch positions. Supply caches must be established by the supported forces, and goods carried at night and when the situation permits. This must balanced by the principle of minimum movement.

Pack horses can be a precious asset to fulfil this task. Being all-weather capable and self-sustaining, they are also able to compensate for helicopters, for example in longer periods of poor weather or if the situation does not permit helicopter operations. They should be considered additionally to other means to resupply elevated offroad mortar positions with ammunition, especially with tactics running single tube positions, in order to guarantee permanent supply even when helicopters are cancelled.

This short paper is to be understood as an index. The topics are only discussed at the surface level. The detailed elaboration of considerations and Lessons Learned would fill a handbook.

To conclude the article I offer this statement:

Mountain warfare without effective fire support will not be successful; to achieve effective support, detailed planning, proper equipment and well-trained soldiers are mandatory.

11. 11 -Drones – Lessons Learned in the Russo-Ukrainian War

12. 12 - Introduction to CSS in mountain units

13. 13 - MILENG support in VM in MW

14. 14 - Medical support in Vertical Manoeuvre in Mountain Warfare

15. 15 - CSS by pack animals

16. 16 - CSS by helicopter

17. 17 - Multi-purpose helicopters designed for Special Air Operations

18. 18 - Dual-use of drones in mountainous environments

19. 19 - Why Simulation? The Benefits of Synthetic Hoist Training

20. 20 - Lessons Learned – a view to the future

21. 21 - Field Exercise

22. 22 - Industry Day

23. 23 - Conclusion: ACT FOGO Speech