09 – Preparing for the fight
MSG Tim Roggatz, DEU (A)
2006-2017 Mountain Infantry Battalion 231 Bad Reichenhall (JTAC )
2017-2021 Air Ground Operations School Nancy-Ochey, France (JTAC-Instructor/Evaluator)
2021-2023 German Army SOF KSK Air Land Integration Cell (SOALI Planner/JTAC Instructor)
Email: ksktr009pn@bundeswehr.org
Summary
When we talk about Close Air Support (CAS) in Mountain Warfare, and especially about the specific challenges for a JTAC or any fire support element during the conflict in Afghanistan, we must first take a closer look at the fundamentals and definitions of CAS/JTAC, and carry out a basic terrain analysis of the Area of Operations (AOO).
1. Generalities
This will already give us the answer to many questions concerning the employment, integration, and general challenges for fire support, whether it is ground-based or air to surface fires.
CAS, by definition according to the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3321D, is an event which requires ‘detailed integration’, ‘hostile targets’ and ‘close proximity’ to friendly forces. Additionally, as is also defined by the ATP 3321, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is ‘qualified and certified’ according to ATP 3322 B, and is required to ‘direct the Air action’ against these ‘targets’.
This sounds generally logical and straightforward, but considering the environmental conditions, the frictions of war and other influences in the rough terrain of Afghanistan, it is everything but – not logical, and indeed not straightforward.
First of all, THE Afghan terrain and THE Afghan conflict do not exist. But most importantly, nor does THE solution for any problems for fire support that occurred during the period of more than 20 years when coalition forces served and fought in Afghanistan.
However, we should limit the experience we, and particularly I, had in that country to a specific time and region. Just to clarify that my experiences may or may not be completely different to what others might have experienced. The time and region I’m referring to are the ‘ISAF years’, especially the period between 2009 and 2014 – one of the deadliest periods of the whole conflict. The regions I’m referring to are the northern provinces of Afghanistan – Baghlan Province. Maybe not THE hotspot, compared to many other provinces. Maybe not the region with the highest peaks, the deepest valleys or the roughest environmental conditions, but, and this is in my opinion the most important thing, good enough to display and highlight all the important aspects and lessons learned for fire support in Afghanistan.
When talking about providing fire support, conducting CAS or simply analysing the challenges of these topics, what we should keep in mind at all times is the common guidelines, the tactical directives which applied at that specific period of the conflict. General Petraeus, COM ISAF, in his Tactical Directive from 2010, made a strong statement concerning COIN (counterinsurgency) operations: “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the centre of gravity. Only by providing them with security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and lSAF prevail.” General Allen, COM ISAF, in 2011, in his Tactical Directive, even went a step further: “My intent is to eliminate ISAF-caused civilian casualties across Afghanistan, and minimize civilian casualties throughout the area of operations by reducing their exposure to insurgent operations.”
These two statements are a perfect example for guideline today. Winning hearts and minds and producing zero civilian casualties while conducting Close Air Support.
Once we begin to analyse the challenges and identify potential issues, we must always remember these two Directives.
2. General environmental challenges
So, what are the general challenges for fire support in Afghanistan? What first comes to my mind is the terrain and the weather. In my eyes these, beside all the other aspects which we will consider in this essay, are among the biggest troublemakers when implementing fire support, especially in close proximity to friendly forces. As mentioned above, the Baghlan Province is not the region with the highest peaks in Afghanistan, but with an average altitude of 600m above sea level and mountains up to 3000m, we already have the first indicator of what could possibly happen. This combination of low valleys, high ground, desert-like plateaus, and jungle-like ‘green zones’ around the main river lines crossing the province, provides perfect conditions for enemy forces, especially when dressed as common civilians, and for hideouts or ambush sites. To locate these hideouts and tunnel in the mountainous/desert terrain at a distance of up to several kilometres, or to locate enemy ambush sites during close combat situations in the ‘green zone’, where civilian infrastructure, trenches or any kind of revetments are used, are among the biggest challenges for fire support. It does not matter whether we are talking about CAS or any other indirect or direct fire from various ground-based fire systems.
The primary task of any JTAC and of any Forward Observer (FO), or whoever is in charge of directing the fire, is to identify the enemy’s location and to provide the accurate location to the appropriate supporting asset, of course always considering the movement and location of any coalition forces, and keeping in mind the guidelines, rules of engagement (ROE’s) and so on. According to ATP 3321D, target acquisition in mountainous terrain is one of the greatest challenges JTACs have to face. Poor maps, often old Russian maps from the past, and heavy target location equipment such as Laser Range finders were more or less useless due to the massive use of jamming systems, especially man-portable jamming systems, which were, compared to those used nowadays, not even close to modern man and convoy protection systems. Remember all this took place more than ten years ago.
That being said, the weather conditions were also not comparable to Central European standard weather. For sure infantrymen, and especially those who fight in the mountains, should be used to those weather conditions, but temperatures close to 50° Celsius in summer and minus 30° Celsius in winter are not the ideal conditions to fight against an enemy which is used to that climate. Nevertheless, operating during early mornings or at night was the weapon of choice, particularly for dismounted patrols during summertime. Poor Night Vision Devices did not make target acquisition easier for any fire support personnel.
As we can see, there were many different influences and general challenges for fire support personnel in those environmental conditions; the list goes on.
But let’s focus a little bit more on the challenges for JTACs.
3. Unique JTAC challenges in Mountain Warfare
Before we come up with further challenges, we should take a quick look at the main tasks of a JTAC during these years. Within the COIN scenario the core tasks of a JTAC could vary a great deal: from providing armed overwatch during mounted or dismounted patrols for friendly forces, to Non-Traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NTISR), to providing CAS for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The spectrum was as wide as the COIN mission itself.
One of the biggest challenges JTACs had to face during that period was the support to the ANSF. Often only connected via an interpreter on the phone, we tried to provide them with air power. Not having any situational awareness (SA) and not being in ‘close proximity’ to these forces made it very difficult to support them in an appropriate way. Most of the time, a picture from the targeting pod of the supporting aircraft was all we got, and even then, it was nearly impossible to define who was operating where on the battlefield.
The key phrase is ‘battle tracking’. It was not only with the ANSF that this caused several problems. Even with friendly or coalition forces, the use of marking devices was challenging. Combined patrols with other notions and different TTPs within the platoons and squads, and the variation in the length of convoys, sometimes up to kilometres, with different kinds of vehicle, number of soldiers and so on, clearly made it difficult to keep the overall SA at a high level. Especially in Troops in Contact (TIC) situations, the use of marking devices was essential to provide proper ‘target talk on’ for the aircrew and to enhance the SA for all the involved players. The use of coloured smoke during the day and infrared marking at night had a huge impact on the situation, significantly simplifying JTACs’ work.
Airborne-used markings, such as white phosphorus rockets, are also an appropriate tool, especially when aircrew has an increased SA compared to the JTAC on the ground. Aircrew can ‘mark’ enemy positions using these rockets, and the smoke will help friendly forces to identify the often well-covered enemy hideouts.
Proper ‘target talk on’, meaning to bring the eyes of the aircrew onto the correct spot, is also one of the challenges. We have already spoken about the environment. Traditionally the target talk on begins at a given ‘reference point’ (RP), which might be a prominent building, a significant road intersection, or just a single large tree standing in the middle of nowhere. But to find that ‘unique’ object in the middle of the desert or the jungle-like conditions of the green zone was not that easy. We may think of just providing proper coordinates, passing them to the aircraft, opening the targeting pod and away we go, but in an environment where friendly and coalition forces were using jamming systems, which had, by the way, a huge impact on the communication and video downlink (VDL), the use of optical devices to provide these coordinates was useless. Providing maps, in addition, were also no big help, because everything looked exactly the same: brown, green or grey with Cyrillic letters on it. So, whenever we stopped we took the time to switch off jamming systems and tried to ‘label’ the current area, in order to ease further target talk on between us and the aircraft, and also for upcoming events to already have something in hand, in case.
Back to our Afghan partners. The will to support them was one aspect; another aspect was the legal side of it. Different Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for the employment of CAS in support of the ANSF made it nearly impossible for us to support them in the way we were intended to. But not only that kind of support; the legal framework for the employment of CAS was also quite challenging. A variety of different ROEs, the necessity of providing positive identification (PID), a proper pattern of life (POL), taking in account the collateral and cultural concerns, and then requesting permission for the engagement at the right time to the correct agency made it nearly impossible to support the troops in an appropriate way, other than being under fire in a self-defence (SD) situation.
4. CAS in a multinational environment
National caveats were, in addition to the aforementioned challenges, also a big factor.
Dutch F-16s, for example, were only allowed to employ air to surface ammunition while in self-defence; JTACs were operating under the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom mandate; the list goes on.
In addition to the ‘official’ problems, we had to face a more unique challenge which popped up during the employments: the mindset and culture differences between the nations. Just imagine working closely together with a variety of partners from different nations, who all have their own interpretation of the term ‘self-defence’. It sounds funny, but it can lead to misunderstanding and complications. For example, a man with a rifle dressed in civilian clothes, walking on a path through the mountains, is not, in our German common way of understanding, a classic self-defence situation, but for other nations it may be. These situations appeared regularly, and showed just how difficult it can be to work in that kind of environment, with different nations and different ways of approach.
Last but not least, we must focus on one of the biggest challenges for any kind of fire support, especially in the mountainous environment, but actually in any environment: communication. Communication is the key to airpower. Without a solid communication plan there will be no Close Air Support, no fire support at all. To keep that communication up at a high level requires detailed integration of the JTAC into the support ground forces. An understanding, at all tactical levels, of the need of a solid communication plan and the needs of a JTAC is essential for mission success.
5. Lessons Learned
What are the Lessons Identified and the Lessons Learned from the ‘ISAF years’?
First of all, as previously mentioned: Communication.
‘No Comms – No CAS’.
This means that a proper PACE Plan for each and every mission is essential. Furthermore, a useful integration of jamming tools will ease the process of having stable comms between air and ground forces.
Using a massive number of jammers may provide the maximum amount of security, but may also lead to poor communication.
Integration is key. The use of liaison officers at all command levels is essential for the integration of air to surface assets.
Additionally, a command standard needs to be made. TTPs must be identical within coalition forces. Mass briefings, training and Rehearsal of Concept drills (ROC) can help to enhance the mission planning.
Back to the basics.
This is the major outcome and the key takeaway for me as a JTAC being deployed in a mountainous environment. The basics are essential. In an environment with rapidly changing weather conditions, with high peaks and deep valleys and an enemy and other coalition forces barely visible, we must go back to the basics. Use what you have – do not focus too much on ‘modern’ stuff. Train yourself in using map, compass and binoculars. Make yourself as familiar with the area as possible. Be in a physically good condition, and most of all prepare for every mission with 120%.
Always remember the five P’s: Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance.