5th Congress Book

10 – Experience of JFS in exercises (‘Heimdall’, ‘Mountain Hornet’)

Estimated reading: 10 minutes 47 views

Maj. David Würtz                                                                                                        2019-             present Air Liasion Officer & JTAC-I/E MtInfBrig 23                              2021               JSOTF GAZELLE NIGER                                                                 2018               Transfer to Air Force                                                                       2014-2018     JTAC & Bn Fire Support Coordination Officer MtInfBn 232      2016               Staff Officer Course Army                                                    2005-2014     Officer Candidate and MtInf Officer                                2005               KFOR Prizren                                                                           2001-2005     Mountain Infantry (OR-1 to OR-6) and Pack Horse Company

Email: davidwuertz@bundeswehr.org

BACKGROUND

Introduction

The war in Ukraine shows once more that modern warfare relies on effective and readily available Fire Support. Not only the shelling of troops in fortified positions by the field artillery of the two opponents, but also, in particular, the target acquisition and guidance of precision strikes of rocket artillery and cruise missiles against high value targets such as supply trains and convoys, air defense and EW systems, and eventually command posts, characterize the war we are witnessing.

The extensive action of raid units in close cooperation with UAVs is also seen in the same conflict. Both the Russian Army and the Ukrainian forces inflict and suffer heavy losses with these tactics.

Most of the fire support is achieved by a mobile phone app and the support of Starlink satellites.

On the other hand, with the (most likely Russian-backed) Serbian escalation on the border with Kosovo, mountain warfare is once again to be considered.

If put together, the aforementioned high value targets (EW, SAM) will be found in proximity to the frontline, due to the nature of the mountainous terrain reducing the reach of line-of-sight systems. These targets will therefore be within reach of regular forces, such as mountain infantry with its reconnaissance teams, UAVs, snipers and JFSTs.

An effective network of sensors and effectors is therefore key to fast, precise and effective fire support.

Small units could be tasked with observing areas and supported by designated effectors in order to find and neutralize specific targets with minimum coordination efforts. Long range reconnaissance patrols, raid units, sniper teams and UAVs with the ability to call in precision strikes could also be sent into target areas of interest to achieve the same goal.

The digitalization of the battlefield is not only short of a big next step implicating digital systems for communication in order to direct fires, such as, for example, digital aided close air support. We are at the brink of a major revolution as the fifth generation fighter aircraft push forward the idea of a combat cloud and AI-enhanced automated fire support.

This is all to be considered when reading the following Lessons Learned from the exercises, with regard to joint fire support in mountain warfare.

The ‘HEIMDALL’ and ‘MOUNTAIN HORNET’ exercises

MOUNTAIN HORNET

As there are no exercises in mountain warfare with enablers like Joint Fire Support and reconnaissance elements as the main training audience, the air force liaison element of Mountain Infantry Brigade 23 (ALE X23) first created and conducted the MOUNTAIN HORNET exercise back in 2019. Since then, the exercise has taken place four times (2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023) in the Bavarian Alps, close to Salzburg. Each year has had a different focus, but fire support in mountain warfare has always been a central feature.

The participants comprise mountain infantry units, reconnaissance platoons, joint fire support teams, UAV squads, EW elements, pack horses, helicopters, military jets and contract air assets, as well as special forces.

As the exercise built up an international reputation, partnering nations like the United States, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy have already sent forces to participate.

The exercise is divided into a training phase, a planning phase, and a 72-hour ongoing operation with opposing forces.

All the stated tactics and manoeuvres providing the following Lessons Learned have been tested and evaluated.

HEIMDALL

The German Navy pushed forward in the matter of Joint Fire Support exercises, creating HEIMDALL as a LIVEX including naval gunfire support, close air support and ground-based fire support in northern Norway.

HEIMDALL 2022 brought three German frigates, one Norwegian corvette, Alpha Jets and one tube 120mm mortars into action. Controlled by a Joint Fire Support Group (JFSCG), a Joint Fire Support Coordination Team (JFSCT), and three Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) consisting of mountain infantry and special operation forces.

The effort required to bring these three branches together in one live fire exercise in northern Norway in winter showed what potential, logistical and organizational challenges and training needs this cooperation implies.

Joint Fire Support in Mountain Warfare – Experiences from the MOUNTAIN HORNET and HEIMDALL exercises

Effects

Mountain terrain is characterized by steep slopes and large changes in elevation, and a mix of very short and far distant views. The weather changes quickly, sometimes within minutes, and so does the visibility if fog or clouds stream through the area.

This effects not only target acquisition and observation, but also devices using laser beams such as Laser Range Finders. Additionally, pilots inside a cockpit or aircraft sensors will regularly have trouble gaining ground visibility. If the surface can be observed by air platforms, mountainous areas mostly have a lack of distinctive terrain features, and peaks and summits often mask targets for manoeuvring aircraft, making visual targeting acquisition difficult and time-consuming.

In addition effects in mountainous terrain may often result in secondary weapon effects such as landslides or avalanches. These secondary effects are mostly difficult to predict and can affect both own troops and the enemy, and must be carefully considered.

Rocky terrain, as well as deep snow, can leave munitions useless, as cases and fuzes may break or the munitions may be absorbed before detonation, mitigating fragmentation and blast or even remaining unexploded.

Alpine terrain, with large rock formations, steep valleys, trenches and holes, shields the fragmentation and blast of ordnance. This results in the possibility of bringing own troops within dangerous close range without them being affected, but also the risk that the engaged targets maybe unaffected even with impacts in direct proximity.

The amount of employed ordnance will be significantly higher in mountain warfare to achieve the comparable effects in flat terrain. Fuse setting is a major consideration in fire support missions in alpine terrain.

Movement

Movement of troops, equipment and supply is a major challenge in mountain warfare. Rough terrain with large differences in elevation and steep cliffs, as well as extreme and swiftly changing weather conditions, influences movement and therefore complicates the planning and execution of operations.

In order to bring small teams, e.g. JFST, into impassable terrain to fulfil a specific task, insertion with freefall parachutes is a viable option. Due to unreliable weather conditions, contingency insertion is paramount. This affects the equipment of these forces, since exfiltration on foot must always be considered. Since jumping into unknown alpine terrain brings a marked risk of injury, the idea of inserting specialists via a tandem parachute jump is not to be recommended. This is especially the case where teams using parachute tactics would tactically jump in full gear, such as by night into the mountains. Perhaps ‘high exit high opening’ tactics with a long glide phase and a drop zone in a grassy valley or a large elevated pasture may work.

Modern warfare is most likely linked to extensive helicopter operations. Whenever the situation and weather allows, helicopters should be used to ensure rapid movement of troops and supply. Nevertheless, due to the impact of weather on helicopter operations, contingency planning is inevitable, and operations should be planned to be timely and flexible whenever possible in order to use time windows with favourable weather conditions.

As a consequence, JFSTs in mountain warfare must be physically robust and also require suitable equipment in order to survive alpine conditions. Furthermore, they need to be trained to move dismounted in challenging terrain, as helicopters may always be cancelled due to the weather. Deriving from this statement, equipment must be light and minimalistic.

Movement also includes the movement of ‘air-players’ like UAVs, helicopters and fighter jets. These players must share their airspace not only with each other, but also with mortar shells and missiles like Javelin or MELLS. As the terrain in the mountains naturally has a higher elevation above mean sea level (MSL), airspace with a top level given in MSL is smaller than in flat terrain. This sounds logical but is often overlooked in the planning phase. Higher airspace must be requested, since approving entities generally do not think of specialties in mountain warfare.

Communication

Communications with line-of-sight (LOS) radios are generally degraded and carry big challenges in mountain warfare. This is not the exemption but the norm in these operations. With weather and space weather influencing frequencies, and terrain naturally blocking the line of sight in the mountains, a detailed terrain and weather assessment in the planning phase must take place. This is a crucial point for a successful joint fire mission in mountain warfare.

To mitigate the disadvantageous factors, all available means of communication must be considered. Wherever possible, beyond line-of-sight radios, such SATCOM and HF Radios, should be implemented. For SATCOM, thorough planning, preparation and training of the operators is required. HF radios can help in bridging long distances. They should be operated to transmit data; transmission windows and an execution checklist help to minimize traffic.

Since JFSTs, snipers and reconnaissance squads regularly man elevated positions, equipping these forces with relay stations and allowing them to operate these should be considered. Mountain forces also should acquire UAVs, which can be operated as relays in order to optimize communication.

To counter all the aforementioned issues, and to minimize comms, a detailed fire support matrix should be created in order to ensure the concept of fires even with low comms by assigning effectors to sensors by task, phase or timing.

Sustainment

As mentioned in the Movement section, supply in mountain warfare requires a tremendous effort.

Resupply can be achieved by aerial resupply drops or helicopter supply lifts. These are again dictated by weather conditions.

For this reason, small teams serving as sensors for fire support in mountain warfare should carry 42 hours supply as standard to be self-sustaining and survive supply gaps due to unfavourable weather windows.

Helicopters or aerial resupply will not always be able to deliver directly to the troops in overwatch positions. Supply caches must be established by the supported forces, and goods carried at night and when the situation permits. This must balanced by the principle of minimum movement.

Pack horses can be a precious asset to fulfil this task. Being all-weather capable and self-sustaining, they are also able to compensate for helicopters, for example in longer periods of poor weather or if the situation does not permit helicopter operations. They should be considered additionally to other means to resupply elevated offroad mortar positions with ammunition, especially with tactics running single tube positions, in order to guarantee permanent supply even when helicopters are cancelled.

This short paper is to be understood as an index. The topics are only discussed at the surface level. The detailed elaboration of considerations and Lessons Learned would fill a handbook.

To conclude the article I offer this statement:

Mountain warfare without effective fire support will not be successful; to achieve effective support, detailed planning, proper equipment and well-trained soldiers are mandatory.